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THE EFFECT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
AGENCY ACT OF 2009 ON CONSUMER CREDIT

David S. Evans and Joshua D. Wright*
I. Introduction

n 2009, the United States Department of the Treasury
submitted the Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA)
Act of 2009 to Congress, proposing a sweeping overhaul of
consumer financial regulation.1 Congress has wrestled with the
Administration's proposal in the ensuing months. In December
2009, the House of Representatives passed a bill that adopted
some key elements of the Administration's bill but discarded
others.' As of the printing of this Article, the Senate is still
* Evans is Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School; Executive Director,
Jevons Institute for. Competition Law and Economics, and Visiting Professor,
University College London; and Managing Director, LECG. Wright is
Assistant Professor, George Mason University Law School and Department of
Economics. We would like to thank Lubomira Ivanova, Daniel Garcia Swartz
and Vanessa Yanhua Zhang for helpful comments and suggestions and Ruslan
Kochemirovskiy, Alina Marinova, of LECG, and Judd Stone of Northwestern
University School of Law, for exceptional research assistance. We are grateful
to the American Bankers Association for financial support. This paper is a
revised version of a paper that was initially circulated in October 2009.
1 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGENCY ACT OF 2009
(2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/CFPA-Act.pdf (last
visited Feb. 10, 2010) [hereinafter CFPA Act] (proposing 2009 Consumer
Financial Protection Agency legislation for passage by Congress). The reforms
of consumer financial protection and the proposal to create a single agency
were presented on July 17, 2009 in UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION 55-75 (2009) [hereinafter New Foundation], available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010) (outlining proposals for various governmental regulations of
financial services and credit products).
2 We discuss the differences between the Administration and the House
bill below. See generally, infra note 13 and accompanying text.
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working on this contentious subject, and, as of the end of 2009, no
bill had advanced to a Committee vote. This Article analyzes the
Administration's bill since it provides the template for the other
legislation considered and because some of the ideas advanced by
the Treasury Department are worthy of debate regardless of
whether they are adopted during the current session of Congress
(or at all).
The Administration's proposed legislation would create a
new agency that would assume many of the consumer protection
functions of several federal regulatory agencies, and have
jurisdiction over virtually all consumer financial products and
services.3 The new agency is intended to achieve stronger
regulation of consumer financial products and services through
more extensive powers than existing agencies have under current
laws.4 Under the Administration's bill, the CFPA would have the
power to, among other things:
" Prohibit certain consumer financial products or
services or features of those products or services;'
" Impose more stringent and intrusive disclosure
requirements on providers of consumer financial
products and services;6
" Require that providers offer "plain vanilla"
products that the agency would design, before or
at the same time those providers offered their own
variants on these standard products;7 and
" Ensure
that
underserved
consumers
and
communities would have access to consumer

These include the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration, and the
Federal Trade Commission. See CFPA Act, supra note 1, at § 1061(a). While
the CFPA would normally regulate many consumer financial products and
services, there are two principal exceptions: (1) insurance would be excluded,
except for credit insurance, mortgage insurance, and title insurance; and (2)
investment products that are already regulated by the SEC or CFTC would be
excluded. CFPA Act, supra note 1, at § 1082(d).
* New Foundation, supra note 1, at 3 ("We propose

. . . stronger

regulations to improve the transparency, fairness, and appropriateness of
consumer and investor products and services").
' CFPA Act, supra note 1, at § 1031(c).
6 Id. at § 1032.
' Id. at § 1036(b).
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services, lending, and investment."
The proposed legislation expressly allows states and
localities to impose stricter regulations than those adopted by the
CFPA and engage in enforcement efforts complementing those
conducted by the CFPA.9 The Act would therefore end federal
preemption of state consumer protection for nationally chartered
financial institutions. The Act would also change the law on
consumer financial protection by extending the current
condemnation of "unfair and deceptive practices" to include
"abusive" practices,1 ° and require that lenders make "reasonable"
disclosures."
The Treasury Department initially proposed this new
system of consumer financial protection, in its June 2009 white
paper Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation.
However, the proposal for the new agency and many of the key
principles for how this agency would regulate consumer financial
products were presented in articles and reports that were
authored by several law professors, including the Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury who was significantly involved in the
drafting of the legislation. 12 These articles and reports provide the
intellectual foundation for modifications in consumer protection
regulation, premised on the assumption that consumers are
irrational and make mistakes systemically in how they borrow
money. Accordingly, these writings provide a guide for how its
proponents intend the new agency and laws to work.
This Article concludes that CFPA Act as proposed by the
s Id. at

§ 1014(c)(2).
Id. at § 1035(a). Currently, OCC rules preempt states and localities from
supervising, examining and regulating the business activities of national banks
and their operating subsidiaries. 12 C.F.R. pt. 7, 34; UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OCC PREEMPTION
RULES: OCC SHOULD FURTHER CLARIFY THE APPLICABILITY
OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS TO NATIONAL BANKS
(2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06387.pdf (last visited Feb.
10, 2009). See also Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470
(2006).
10 The terms "abusive" and "abuse" are not defined in the Act. See
generally CFPA Act, supra note 1, at § 1002 (listing definitions of various terms
under the proposed Act).
I CFPA Act, supra note 1, at § 1032(b).
12See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir,
Behaviorally Informed Financial Services Regulation 1 (New American
Foundation Working Paper, October 2008); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth
Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 39 (2008).
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U.S. Department of the Treasury would:
" Make it harder and more expensive for consumers
to borrow, and would risk reversing the decadeslong trend towards the democratization of credit;
" Create a "supernanny" agency that is designed to
substitute the choice of bureaucrats for those of
consumers; and
" Jeopardize financial recovery by reducing credit
during a severe economic recession; a time when
the economy is fragile and there is already too little
credit.
We briefly explain each of our findings in this introduction.
The Treasury's CFPA Act would also make it harder and
more expensive for consumers to borrow. It would likely:
" Prohibit lenders from offering some credit
products and services that benefit consumers. The
CFPA would have the power to prohibit such
products and services. Meanwhile, proponents of
the agency have argued that many common
products, including subprime mortgages and credit
cards, are of little benefit to consumers.
" Impose significant additional costs on lenders that
would be passed on to borrowers. These costs
would include exponentially higher litigation and
regulatory costs that would result from allowing
states and municipalities to adopt more stringent
regulations, and simultaneously imposing new and
untested liability standards on lenders. They also
include the costs of complying with the stronger
regulations that the CFPA is likely to apply.
" Require lenders to push consumers towards
lending products designed by the CFPA. The
CFPA would have the power to impose significant
costs on lenders offering innovative lending
products and the consumers who want them. The
CFPA's proponents strongly advocated this
paternalistic approach in which the government
provides "nudges" to force consumers to take an
option these proponents prefer. There is no reason
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to believe that products designed by a regulatory
agency would be better than those designed by
lenders and freely chosen by consumers. (The
CFPA may have sufficient powers to "induce"
lenders to provide products of its design even
without the ability to require lenders to offer "plain
vanilla" products.)

These aspects of the CFPA Act would result in consumers
losing access to methods of lending that the agency prohibits, or,
in other cases, forcing lenders to withdraw as a result of the
higher costs they incur. Lenders will also pass on the higher costs
resulting from federal and state regulation of lending products to
consumers in the form of higher interest rates and fees. These
aspects of the CFPA Act would likely reverse the decade long
trend towards the democratization of credit. The increased cost of
lending coupled with requirements to offer agency-designed
products is likely to result in a significant reduction in credit
availability, particularly to people who have historically had
more difficulty obtaining access to credit. Finally, the increased
cost of credit and reduced availability would impose collateral
damage on small businesses that often rely on consumer financial
products.
The CFPA Act would create a "supernanny" that is
designed to substitute bureaucratic choice for consumer choice.
The CFPA Act, as explained by its proponents, is based on the
findings of "behavioral law and economics" that consumers make
bad decisions when it comes to financial services products and
would be made better off with the government steering them to
better decisions. A Consumer Financial Protection Agency
premised on this paternalistic view would be prone to replace
what consumers believe is in their interest with its own views. It
is doubtful that even the most well-educated bureaucrats could
design sustainable and profitable products better suited to satisfy
consumer needs than those designed by lenders. Similarly, it is
unlikely that any group of regulators could make better decisions
to police borrowing terms than the consumers with the greatest
stake in the loan.
The CFPA Act poses especially severe risks to American
households and to the economy over the next few years. The
American economy remains fragile. Credit availability to
households remains restricted, which has hurt those households
directly. The credit crunch has also indirectly harmed consumers
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through decreased economic activity, resulting in fewer jobs and
reduced incomes. In addition to the long-run effects the CFPA
Act would have on credit availability, the proposed legislation
would also especially dampen credit availability in the near-term
because financial institutions would face a great deal of
uncertainty over the scope and risks of the new regulations. The
resulting reduction in credit availability would likely slow the
nascent economic recovery and especially impact job creation as
a result of the multiplier effect of consumer spending on economic
activity. It would also dampen the formation of new businesses
that generate most of the economy's net new jobs. Adopting a
new regulatory system for consumer financial products that
would make it more difficult for consumers to borrow in 2010
and 2011 is an especially bad idea.
Our conclusion is that the Treasury Department's CFPA
Act of 2009 is a misguided attempt to erect an agency that could
substitute its own view for those of consumers on how and under
what circumstances consumers should be able to borrow money.
Short-term, the CFPA Act would tighten the credit crunch that
still threatens the economy; long-term, it would reduce the
availability of credit to both consumers and small businesses.
Most alarmingly, the CFPA Act-induced reduction in credit
availability would reverse successful efforts to democratize credit
by which all segments of American consumers have increasingly
been able to borrow to meet their short-term and long-term
needs."3
The remainder of the Article explains the basis for our
conclusions. One must begin with an understanding as to how
consumers benefit from the variety of lending products available
to them in order to understand why the CFPA Act will likely
'3 On December 11, 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2009. H.R.
4173, lllst Cong. (2009). Title IV of that bill addresses consumer financial
protection. See generally CFPA Act, supra note 1, at § 4001. There are many
key differences between the House bill and the Administration's proposed bill.
Most importantly the House bill eliminates the proposed "plain vanilla"
provisions discussed at some length in this paper as well as the proposed
"reasonableness" requirements. The House bill also retains elements of the
"state preemption" problems we discuss, though it limits these with regards to
banks at the discretion of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The
House bill nevertheless still imposes liability for "abusive" lending practices,
consolidates vast swaths of financial regulation in the Director of the Agency,
and provides states various incentives to litigate, such as the opportunity to
recover litigation costs. Id. at §§ 4301(a), 4102(a)(2), 4505(b).
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prove harmful. Furthermore, it is important to recognize how
financial innovation through the proliferation of consumer credit
products has democratized credit by making it available to an
ever-broadening segment of society. Accordingly, we explain each
of these in Sections II and III respectively. We then turn in
Section IV to explaining the rationale for the CFPA Act as
proposed. In Section V, we analyze how the provisions of the
CFPA Act and the powers granted to the new agency would
likely affect the cost and availability of consumer credit to
households and small businesses. Finally, Section VI presents our
conclusion - the CFPA Act would likely harm consumers and
small businesses by restricting the availability of credit at a time
when the economy needs more, rather than less, credit.
II. Consumer Borrowing
A. Consumer Benefits from Borrowing
Households mainly borrow to even out how much they
consume over their lifecycles. People tend to have increasing
wages over the first couple of decades of their time in the
workforce. Wages eventually plateau and then decline until
retirement. Table 1 shows that this trend varies according to
educational level. If people neither borrowed nor saved, they
would live much better in middle age than earlier or later stages
of their earnings cycle. In fact, to the extent they are able to,
households usually borrow more when they are young. They may
take out substantial loans to finance education, purchase durable
consumer goods, or even purchase a home. As individuals get
older, however, they can reduce borrowing and become "net
savers" through home ownership or other investments. They
draw down their investments, plus forced savings such as social
security, after they leave the work force. Table 2 shows the
typical profile of borrowing and asset accumulation over a
lifecycle.
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Table 1. Lifetime earnings for different levels of education in 2007 dollars.
Education
Level

18-24

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65+

< High school

10,890

21,676

24,385

25,800

24,841

24,691
25,679

High school

16,791

28,982

36,060

36,562

34,160

Some college

13,477

31,843

41,541

44,201

40,838

31,938

Bachelor's
degree

25,976

51,580

71,394

76,993

72,368

55,517

60,336

86,603

92,471

86,080

59,944

Postgraduate

Note: Earnings values correspond to averages for male and female workers.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Income Tables, available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/p28.html.
Table 2. Borrowing and income over the lifecycle in 2007 dollars.
Income

Debt

$51,700

$100,700

35 - 44

$83,700

$148,000

45 - 54

$112,400

$148,500

55 - 64

$111,200

$131,500

65 - 74

$92,400

$107,700

> 74

$45,700

$45,100

Age
< 35

Note:Debt includes consumer and mortgage debt. Income corresponds to
average annual before-tax income.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Survey of Consumer Finance,
2007. The debt line shows the level of accumulated debt at a point in time
while the income line shows the annual income at a point in time.

Consumers borrow for other reasons as well. Some
consumers borrow because they have experienced unanticipated
drops in income, perhaps due to a job loss or a divorce. Others
borrow because they have an unusual expense, such as a wedding
or a vacation. Many consumers also borrow to pay for more
frequent or necessary expenses such as buying clothes or
groceries.14 As has always been the case, some consumers take on
" Consumer surveys have found that consumers typically prefer to use
their debit cards instead of credit cards for small everyday purchases. See, e.g.,
Susan Reda, 2003 Consumer Credit Survey, STORES MAGAZINE, Nov. 2003.
Further, economists explain the underlying consumer preference to use debit
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more debt than they should and run into trouble." But, by and
large, most people borrow responsibly.16
Consumers benefit directly from borrowing. Economists
have shown that as a result of aligning consumption and income
more closely, consumers can increase their overall level of wellbeing over their lifetimes. In any event, most people who can
borrow against their future incomes tend to enjoy a nicer lifestyle
when they are younger than they could achieve from current
income. Consumers also benefit indirectly from borrowing. By
buying more, consumers enable businesses to expand production
and create more jobs.18 This, in turn, raises consumer income and
spending. Moreover, international experience also suggests that
the availability of credit spurs economic growth."
cards instead of credit cards with "mental accounting." Mental accounting
refers to the thought process that consumers engage in before they enter into a
transaction that discourages them from overspending, and serves as a
mechanism for self-regulation. See Drazen Prelec & George Loewenstein, The
Red and The Black: Mental Accounting of Savings and Debt, 17 MARKETING
SCIENCE 4 (1998).
" See generally Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer
Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1492-99 (2005).
16 The American Bankruptcy Institute reported that there were 1,064,927
personal bankruptcy filings in 2008, which corresponds to less than 1% of U.S.
households. See American Banking Institute, Press Release, Consumer
Bankruptcy Filings up Nearly 33 percent in 2008 (Jan. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm ?Section=Home&TEMPLATE =/
CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=56120 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, 3.3 percent of mortgages were
in the foreclosure process at the end of 2008. See also, Mortgage Bankers
Association, Press Release, Delinquencies and ForeclosuresContinue to Climb
in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey per American (May 28, 2009),
available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/
69031.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). The average credit card default was
5.73% in August according to Moody's. See Moody's Credit Card Index
Improves in July, FORBES, Aug. 21, 2009. These rates are lower during normal
economic times.
"7Economists explain this pattern of consumer behavior with the
permanent income hypothesis according to which people base their
consumption expenditures on long-term income trends. See Paul Samuelson &
William Nordhaus, ECONOMICS 16,421 (1998).
"8The essence of this is the multiplier mechanism where an increase in
investment raises the income of consumers and thereby leads to a cascading
chain of further spending increases. See id. at 446-54.
16 See Aghion Philippe, Abhijit V. Banerjee, George-Marios Angeletos &
Kalina B, Manova, Volatility and Growth: Credit Constraints and
Productivity-Enhancing Investment, MIT DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
WORKING
PAPER
No.
05-15,
Apr.
30,
2005,
available at
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B. The Risks of Lending to Consumers
Financial institutions, however, face some serious
problems in lending to consumers. There is great uncertainty over
the ability of any individual to pay back a loan. The earnings
with which an individual borrower can pay back the loan are
unknown and in the future. Moreover, it can be difficult to collect
when people default because sometimes their only collateral is
whatever money they might earn from future work. Lending
faces the well-known problems of adverse selection (loans are
most attractive to those who are least likely to pay them back);
asymmetric information (borrowers know more about their
ability to repay than lenders ever could); and moral hazard
(borrowers will take less care to repay loans if they know they can
avoid repayment as a result of debt relief laws, rules and
programs, and possible lender forbearance).
The risks to lenders from adverse selection, asymmetric
information, and moral hazard tend to result in precautionary
limits on the amount of lending - or liquidity - available to
consumers. Under extreme conditions, consumers who want to
borrow cannot find anyone to lend to them. Centuries ago there
was little consumer lending because of the risks of collecting; and
there was little borrowing because laws to ensure repayment and thus reduce moral hazard ,- had draconian consequences
including time in "debtor prison"3 °
Economists use the term "liquidity constraint" to refer to
the situation in which an individual cannot receive additional
credit at any price. Some households cannot receive any credit at
all while other households cannot receive additional credit even
though they are willing to pay for it. Over the years, consumers
have seen the relaxation of these liquidity constraints as a result
of the development of financial markets and innovations in the
provision of financial products and services that have enabled
lenders to better deal with adverse selection, asymmetric

http://ssrn.com/abstract=719772 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (finding that
"tighter financial constraints make R&D investment and growth more
sensitive to shocks, while also generating a more negative correlation between
volatility and growth to both higher aggregate volatility" for a panel of
countries over the period 1960-2000).
20 Even English landowners did not mortgage their property before the
1600s because if they missed a payment, they forfeited their entire holdings.
See generally Giuseppe Bertola et al., THE ECONOMICS OF CONSUMER
CREDIT 1-27 (MIT Press 2006).
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information, and moral hazard problems. These developments
have especially benefited members of socially and economically
disadvantaged groups. Over the last several decades, the supply
of credit has become democratized with, as we will discuss below,
all but the very poorest members of society able to borrow to
some degree.
C. Moral Objections to Borrowing and Lending
Not everyone has applauded the democratization of
consumer borrowing over the years. There has been an almost
constant thread of moral opprobrium to borrowing from various
quarters since the early days of our country. During the 19'l
century, as retailers increasingly provided consumer credit,
various social commentators warned against the practice. One
social critic chastised women for the "curious process of
reasoning" that led them to buy on installment rather than paying
up front.2 1 By the turn of the 2 0 t h century, social commentators
further warned against the evils of spending and going into debt
through morality tales such as Keeping Up with Lizzie (which
inspired the subsequent comic strip Keeping up with the Joneses).
As Irving Bacheller's "Charge It" observed in 1912, "Credit is the
latest ally of the devil. It is the great tempter. It is responsible for
half the extravagance of modern life. 2 These commentators have
23
argued for public policies to prevent consumers from borrowing.
American consumers have largely chosen to ignore this
well-meaning advice throughout the nation's history. Instead,
American consumers have embraced new forms of credit that
enable them to enhance their current standards of living through
borrowing. By and large that is an economically sensible response
to the shape of lifecycle earnings, and most consumers do so
responsibly. As we will see below, the academic scholars who
designed the CFPA and are its leading proponents are the
intellectual heirs of the social critics who thought that credit is the
"great tempter" from which consumers should be restrained and
protected.

" Lendol Calder, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A
CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 181 (Princeton
University Press 2001).
22 Irving Bacheller, "CHARGE IT," OR KEEPING UP WITH HARRY
116 (Harper & Brothers 1912).
23 CALDER, supra note 21, at Ch.3.
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III. The Democratization of Consumer Lending
Beginning in the early 1980s, a number of innovations
significantly reduced liquidity constraints, thereby enabling more
2
These innovations helped increase
Americans to borrow more4.
credit availability dramatically for members of socially and
disadvantaged groups, and consequentially
economically
democratized credit. The gaps between credit availability for
households headed by upper income white men and credit
availability for households headed by single parents, the less welloff, and minorities closed considerably. The expansion in
consumer spending also helped fuel economic growth and job
creation and helped sustain a long period of economic expansion
that began in 1982 and continued, with some minor recessions
along the way, until the recent financial crisis.
A. Computerized Risk Analysis and Securitization
and
risk analysis
in computerized
Innovations
securitization were both major developments that triggered these
improvements. Both innovations, however, have become
controversial recently as each played a contributing role in the
current financial crisis. After we describe these innovations, we
will explain that it was the failure of financial institutions to
properly use these tools rather than a problem with the tools
themselves that led to the crisis. It is therefore important to
preserve the benefits of these innovations while dealing directly
with the problems that were exposed by the financial crisis.
i.

Risk Analysis

We mentioned earlier that lenders are reluctant to provide
credit to individuals because of problems of adverse selection,
asymmetric information, and moral hazard. Advances in risk
analysis over the last three decades have steadily reduced the
severity of these problems. Those advances have resulted from a
combination of the information technology revolution (which has
provided more and cheaper computer power), the increased
availability of credit-related data on individuals, and the
development of sophisticated algorithms for predicting risk."
Angela Lyons, How Credit Access Has Changed Over Time for U.S.
Households, 37 THE J. OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 231, 248 (2003).
2 Robert M. Hunt, A Century Of Consumer Credit Reporting in America
24
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Sophisticated "automatic underwriting" of loans began
with credit cards; such loans are unsecured and are therefore very
risky. There were significant defaults when credit cards were first
issued en masse in the 1970s. Fair-Isaac was one of several
companies to develop credit scores based on mathematical models
that credit card lenders and others could use as inputs into their
risk assessment models. Its "FICO"score, developed in the 1980s,
became the standard measure for credit risk. 6 Some large lenders
followed suit and developed their own scoring systems based on
public information as well as relevant proprietary information
they have available for clients." As we document below, steady
refinements of these risk assessment models have proved critical
in enabling credit card issuers to expand credit to an ever wider
group of Americans.
Automatic underwriting was adopted by the mortgage
industry in the mid 1990s. Prior to automatic underwriting, all
mortgages were evaluated by hand based on various guidelines.
Automatic underwriting based on statistical models of credit
default caught on quickly. By 2000, 60 to 70 percent of loans were
evaluated based on these techniques." Several factors were
important to the growth of these automated risk analyses for
mortgages. Studies found that the automatic techniques were able

(Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper, June 2005), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 757929. See also Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Financial Innovation and Consumer
Protection, Keynote Address at the Federal Reserve System's Sixth Biennial
Community Affairs Research Conference (Apr. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090417a.htm
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
26 The FICO scoring system compiles information from a variety of
sources such as public records, credit application reports and awards points,
using mathematical models, for a number of factors that can help predict the
likelihood of a person repaying debts on time (e.g. length of credit history,
types of credit used, amounts owed). The total number of these points - the
credit score - predicts how creditworthy a person is. See History of Fair Isaac
Corporation,
available at
http://www.fico.com/en/Company/Pages/
history.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
7 Consumer Federation of America, FairIsaac Corporation, Your Credit
Score, available at http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic-text/money/creditscores/
your.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
28 John W. Straka, A Shift in the Mortgage Landscape: The 1990s Move to
Automated Credit Evaluations, 11 JOURNAL OF HOUSING RESEARCH 207, 216

(2000),
available at http://www.knowledgeplex.org/kp/text-document_
summary/scholarly-article/relfiles/jhr_1102_straka.pdf (last visited Feb. 10,
2009).
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to reliably identify a larger pool of credit-worthy candidates and
do so at a lower cost than human underwriters. These automated
techniques also enabled the lenders to better verify origination
decisions and to reduce adverse selection problems. These
techniques further reduced opportunities for discrimination
against minorities because the algorithms were "color blind" and
did not factor race or ethnicity information into the calculus. The
significant expansion in mortgage lending to African Americans
that we document below was due at least in part to the
29
development of these automatic underwriting techniques.
Other types of credit also benefited from the development
of sophisticated risk analysis. Overdraft protection, which allows
consumers to receive an advance from the bank when a check
they write exceeds the available funds in their account, has also
benefited from technological innovation. Historically, financial
institutions relied primarily on individual judgment to guide
whether to pay checks that would overdraw a consumer's
account. Recently, however, this process has been automated by
financial institutions, Customers who meet the bank's
predetermined thresholds, which are based on the bank's risk
analysis calculations, are approved instantly. The speed and the
relatively low cost of automated approval also allows banks to
extend this service to non-check transactions including ATM
withdrawals and debit card transactions. As 'Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Ben Bernanke remarked: "Although institutions
usually charged the same amount when they paid an overdraft as
when they returned the check unpaid, many consumers
appreciated this service because it saved them from additional
'30 Of
merchant fees and the embarrassment of a bounced check.
course, there are legitimate controversies over whether consumers
receive adequate notification of the fees they are required to pay
for overdraft protection. But consumers largely benefit - they
escape public embarrassment or general uneasiness from inability
to make a purchase - when their checking account balances are
temporarily low.
Automobile loans have also become more accessible to
consumers because of developments in credit scoring and risk
analysis. For example, the process for approving an auto loan has
been reduced to hours or minutes instead of days and weeks. By
2001, 84 percent of automobile loan applicants in the United
29
30

Id. at 227.
See Bernanke, supra note 25, at 1.
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States received a decision within an hour while 23 percent of
applicants received a decision in less than 10 minutes.3 1
ii. Securitization
Before the development of securitization, lenders generally
held onto loans they financed. This limited total bank lending to
a multiple of their capital and also exposed these lenders to
considerable variety of risks - such as events like a plant closing
in the community served by a small bank - that affected many
of the loans in the lenders' portfolios. With securitization, the
originators of loans were able to sell off some or all of their loans
to other market participants and thereby diversify their risks.
Moreover, by creating a security instrument that consisted of a
portfolio of loans, it became possible to sell these instruments to
the emerging global capital markets. Doing so increased the
supply of funds that were available for lending; with the loan
removed from the bank's books, the bank had funds freed up to
lend to more customers.
Securitization has experienced tremendous growth since it
was introduced in the 1970s, expanding from mortgage loans to
encompass a wide range of financial assets, including automobile
loans and leases, student loans, credit card loans, and small
business loans. The value of outstanding mortgage-backed
securities increased from $6.6 trillion in 2004 to $8.9 trillion in
2008 (in constant 2008 dollars). Similarly, securitization of other
types of loans such as automobile, credit card, home equity,
manufacturing, and student loans grew from $528 billion in 1996
to $2.7 trillion in 2008 (in constant 2008 dollars).33
31 Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, The Impact of National Credit
Reporting Under the FairCredit Reporting Act: The Risk of New Restrictions
and State Regulation, FINANCIAL SERVICE COORDINATING COUNCIL (2003),
http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/privacy/pdf/FSCC
available
at
BenefitsCreditReporting.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
32 Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, MortgageSecurities
Outstanding,
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/
Backed
Research/Statistics/SIFMA_USMortgageRelatedOutstanding.pdf (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010). Numbers are converted into constant 2008 dollars using GDP
deflator series from the Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator. See
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price
Deflator, available at http://research.st;ouisfed.org/fred2/data/GDPDEF.txt
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010), (outlining data last updated August 27, 2009).
" Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Asset-Backed
http://www.sifma.org/research/pdf/AB S
Securities
Outstanding,
Outstanding.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2009). Numbers are converted into
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iii. Breakdowns in the Subprime Mortgage Market
The subprime mortgage crisis revealed significant
breakdowns in financial institutions' application of both risk
analysis and securitization. Loan-to-value ratios increased, a
greater fraction of households received mortgages that were
interest only, and more households received mortgages without
having full documentation. Mortgage brokers, who relied heavily
on commission, increasingly overlooked warning signs in
submitting loan applications from "unqualified" clients. 4 Most
importantly, the financial institutions that purchased these
subprime mortgages and packaged them into securities, the credit
agencies that rated these securities, and the investors who bought
these securities did not account for the possibility of a significant
slowdown or decline in the change in housing prices. A broadbased decline in housing prices cannot be diversified away by
pooling mortgages because all of these loans would be uniformly
affected by this "correlated risk". The decline in housing prices,
combined with the fact that many of the sub-prime mortgages
needed to be refinanced after two to three years, resulted in a
massive increase in defaults. The foreclosure rate for adjustable
rate subprime mortgages increased from a mere 3 percent in 2005
to over 8 percent in 2007. 35

constant 2008 dollars using GDP deflator series from the Gross Domestic
Product: Implicit Price Deflator. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross
Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator (last visited Sep. 10, 2009) (outlining
data last updated August 27, 2009).
" It appears, however, that the financial markets took these individual
risks into account by demanding significant interest rate premiums on these
loans that could cover significant defaults. What they did not take into account
was the possibility of declines in housing prices that would result in correlated
risks across individuals. For a lengthier discussion of this topic, see Dwight M.
Jaffee, The U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Issues Raised and Lessons
Learned, Commission on Growth and Development, Working Paper No. 28
(2008),
available
at
http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/
cgdev/documents/gcwp028web.pdf
"' Staff of J. Econ. Comm., 110"h Cong., THE SUBPRIME LENDING
CRISIS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE MAJORITY
STAFF OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE 27 (Comm. Print.
2007),
available
at
http://www.gfoa.org/downloads/Congress
SubprimeReport.pdf. For more information on default details rates of
subprime loans by origination year, see James R. Barth, Tong Li, Triphon
Phumiwasana, & Glenn Yago, Perspectives on the Subprime Market (Milken
Institute
Working
Paper,
January
2008),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1070404.
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The problems from the increase in default rates were
exacerbated by the fact that many of the large financial
institutions that packaged the loans kept a significant portion of
the loans on their own books rather than selling them into the
global markets as the basic thesis of securitization suggested they
should have done. 36 These institutions therefore had a
concentration of what had become toxic assets.3
In conclusion, this review of enhanced risk analysis and
securitization has shown that these innovations helped expand
the supply of credit overall and made it available to an ever
wider portion of the American public. As the Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission noted, "Many fail to appreciate that
the average American today enjoys access to credit and financial
services, shopping choices, and educational resources that earlier
Americans could never have imagined. ' 38 Before we document
these effects we describe additional innovations for several
important types of consumer financial products.
B. Financial Innovations for Individual Consumer Financial
Products and Services
i. Mortgages
Although consumers could easily finance the purchase of
sewing machines by the early 2 0 th century, they still had great
difficulty financing the purchase of homes. Residential mortgages
were only available for 5 to 10 years after which the principal
became due and the borrower had to refinance.3 9 Rates were
variable, and loan-to-value ratios were below 50 percent.
Relatively few Americans could finance the purchase of homes.
This situation changed largely as a result of the creation of
federally sponsored mortgage insurance in response to the

See Dwight Jaffee, supra note 34, at 28. See also Dwight M. Jaffee et al.,
Mortgage Originationand Securitizationin FinancialCrisis, in RESTORING
FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 72
(Wiley Finance 2009).
36

3 Id.
38 Timothy

J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Protecting
Consumers' Privacy: Goals and Accomplishments, Remarks at the Networked
Economy
Summit
(June
11,
2002),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/gmason.shtm.
31 Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in
Historicaland InternationalContext, 19 J. OF EcON. PERSPECTIVES 93 (2005).
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housing collapse following the 1929 stock market crash. 40 This
insurance enabled banks to issue long-term fixed rates mortgages.
After World War II these new mortgages enabled millions of
Americans to finance homes during the economic expansion that
started in the early 1950s. The number of American households
who owned homes increased from 23.9 million in 1950 to 36.3
million in 1965 to 78.7 million in 2008. Increases in the supply of
mortgage lending successively enabled the post-World War II
generation, the large baby boom generation, and Generation X to
buy and finance homes.
The stagflation years of the 1970s brought considerable
problems to the housing market. High interest rates led
depositors to move funds from banks that had regulatory ceilings
on the rates they could pay depositors to treasury securities and
other instruments. Depositors, meanwhile, had been a major
source of mortgage funding. At the same time, high interest rates
on fixed rate mortgages put home ownership out of the reach of
many Americans. Efforts to introduce adjustable rate mortgages
during the 1970s met with considerable opposition from
consumer groups, and regulators imposed tight restrictions on
allowable changes in the interest rates. 41 As a result, many
Americans who wanted to buy homes were not able to do so at
fixed rate mortgage terms. They were liquidity constrained.
Although inflation was tamed by the early 1980s, and
interest rates began coming down significantly thereafter, there
was concern that the future would bring significant volatility in
interest rates that would put lenders at risk, and thereby curtail
mortgage lending to households. The main innovation that was
introduced was the 30-year adjustable rate mortgage (ARMs) that
would allow mortgage earnings to keep pace with the cost to

• 'oAs with the current crisis, housing prices fell during the Great
Depression, forcing homeowners to walk away from their loans which resulted
in banks selling foreclosed homes, further driving down home prices.
41 Kristopher Gerardi, Harvey S. Rosen, & Paul Willen, Do Households
Benefit from Financial Deregulation and Innovation? The Case of the
Mortgage Market (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Public Policy Discussion
Papers, June
2006), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/
ppdp/2006/ppdp066.pdf.
42 Many lenders holding portfolios of fixed rate mortgages sustained major
losses when interest rates climbed and the rates they paid for funds were well
above what they earned. The interest rate inversion of the last years of the
1970s and the first years of the 1980s was at the core of the savings and loan
crisis of the 1980s.
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lenders of funding those mortgages. 43 Home purchasers found
these mortgages appealing because they were usually set at shortterm interest rates, which were substantially lower than longterm interest rates and reflected risk premiums for future
inflation. Over the course of the 1980s a significant part of new
mortgage loans were ARMs, reaching a peak of 58 percent in
1988 as shown in Table 3. Many households benefited from the
ARMs because interest rates ended up declining in subsequent
years.
Table 3. Loans with adj. mortgage rates as proportion of all loans, 1984-2003.
Year

Proportion of all loans

1985
1986

50%.
30%

1987
1988
1989

43%
58%
38%

1990
1991
1992

28%
23%
50%

1993
1994
1995

20%
39%
32%

1996
1997
1998

27%
22%
12%

1999
2000
2001

21%
24%
12%

2002
2003

17%
19%

Source: Monthly Interest Rate Survey, Table 34, Federal Housing Finance Board;
http://www.fhfa.gov[Default.aspx?Page=25 2.

As long-term interest rates declined, more home buyers
and households who were refinancing mortgages shifted back to
fixed rate mortgages.
Other innovations were also introduced. These included
ARMs with fixed interest rates for several years, graduated
payment mortgages, mortgages that allowed initial payments to
" Congressional legislation was passed in 1981 to allow S&Ls to invest in
ARMs, which stimulated their supply.
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fall below interest charges, and low down payment mortgages. As
Professor Jaffee observes, "These mortgages were all designed to
meet specific needs: option mortgages for borrowers with widely
fluctuating incomes, converting ARMs for borrowers who expect
'
a rising income profile, and so on."44
Securitization was another major innovation in the
mortgage industry. It was responsible for expanding the source of
capital to make it possible for millions of young Americans,
especially those coming into the labor market and forming
households, to buy homes. Freddie Mac was created in 1970 and
was charged with creating a more liquid market for mortgages.4 5
As discussed, mortgage-backed securities emerged and started
becoming popular in the 1980s. These securities allowed financial
institutions to better diversify their risks by selling some portion
of mortgage loans they had originated. As importantly, they
broke the dependence of the supply of mortgages on the supply of
deposits. Banks could receive compensation for originating and
then servicing loans by selling mortgage backed securities. The
mortgage originators increasingly became intermediaries between
mortgage borrowers and the global capital markets, which vastly
expanded the amount of liquidity available to borrowers.46
A significant portion of the American population was,
nevertheless, still unable to get mortgages in the 1980s. Lower
income individuals, people who had not established a credit
history, possibly because of having faced adverse economic
circumstances, and people with poor credit histories were shut
out of the mortgage lending market. They comprised a
substantial portion of the 20 percent of households that were
liquidity constrained. The U.S. government encouraged financial
institutions to expand lending to these groups for a variety of
policy reasons. Computerized risk analysis and securitization
made the expansion of lending to this underserved part of the
population possible.
Subprime mortgages expanded in the last half of the 1990s
44See Jaffee, supra note 34, at 14.
41See Freddie Mac Corporate

History, http://www.freddiemac.com
news/corpjfacts.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2009).
46 Between 1980 and 2008 the share of home mortgages that were held by
the originating institution declined from 89% to 41%. Meanwhile, the share of
mortgages that were securitized increased from 11% to 59%. See James R.
Barth et al., Mortgage Market Turmoil: The Role of Interest-Rate Resets, 2 GH
BANK HOUSING J. 17 (2007), at 24.

7 Lyons, supra note 24, at 231-32.
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and especially rapidly in the first half of the 2000s. In 1994, only 5
percent of the mortgages that were originated were subprime.
Subprime originations grew to 13 percent in 2000 and reached 20
percent in 2005 and 2006.4 Then the housing bubble burst.
Subprime originations declined sharply, falling to less than 1
percent of all originations in the last quarter of 2008. Although
there were serious problems in the subprime mortgage market, as
discussed below, these mortgages helped a significant number of
socially and economically disadvantage households, most of
whom did not have access to credit, to buy their homes. More
importantly, going forward, it is essential to distinguish between
subprime mortgage lending and the housing bust. Housing prices
will eventually reach a new equilibrium that reflects their
fundamental value, and may experience normal appreciation
thereafter4 9 So long as subprime mortgages reflect the realities of
the housing market, they can enable many socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals to obtain home loans
that they would not otherwise be able to get.
ii. Non-Mortgage Lending
As discussed, consumers borrow money to help smooth out
consumption and income over their lifecycles. Importantly, they
borrow to purchase consumer durables ranging from televisions
to automobiles. American consumers have seen over the nation's
history a steady increase in their ability to borrow to finance
current consumption as a result of innovations in consumer
financial products and services. Over time, these innovations
have provided more credit at cheaper costs to consumers. With
each new innovation, more credit-worthy borrowers have been
able to transition from more costly credit to less expensive forms
of credit as we show below.
During the great economic expansion of the 1 9 th century,
American consumers saw rising incomes over their lifetimes; as a
result, Americans enjoyed an increasing array of consumer
products available to them." As the century progressed, retailers
Barth et al., supra note 35, at 3.
" Between June 2001 and June 2009 home prices appreciated at the rate of
inflation with the gains from the boom being largely offset by the bust. See
Floyd Norris, After a Bumpy Ride, Back at Square One, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2009,
at
B3,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/29/
business/economy/29charts.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
48

10 See THE ECONOMICS OF CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 20, at ch. 9.
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became significant providers of credit to consumers. Retailers
allowed customers to put such purchases on a "house charge" to
be paid at the end of the month and they sold products on
installment plans that allowed consumers to pay over time.51"As
of 1929, retailers were the primary suppliers of consumer credit,
accounting for more than 60 percent of consumer credit with
financial institutions providing the remainder. By 1929, a fifth
of all retail sales were carried on open accounts - a type of
revolving credit -and that share remained roughly steady until
after World War II.

3

Retail credit was expensive by modern

standards. 4
Retail credit was also limited and highly restricted.
Retailers gave customers identification cards that they could use
when they charged merchandise. But generally these cards could
only be used to pay at the retailer that issued the card, or in some
cases, groups of retailers that agreed to use a common card. A key
innovation occurred in 1950 when Diners Club introduced the
general-purpose charge card, which consumers could use at many
unrelated merchants.55 Diners Club provided the financing for
the merchant and collected from the cardholder. Like the house
charge programs, the cardholder paid at the end of the month.
American Express introduced a similar product in 1958; and, by
the end of the 195 0s, charge cards were widely accepted by
merchants and carried by millions of Americans (principally welloff businessmen).56 .
In 1958, Bank of America introduced the modern generalpurpose credit card. It allowed consumers to finance their
purchases over time on a revolving line of credit. This feature
substituted for the various credit programs offered by retailers. At
the time, Bank of America could only operate in California
because of interstate banking regulations. 8 Soon, similar cards
were being introduced and circulated by other banks around the
11Until 1916, most states had usury laws that limited the ability of
financial institutions to lend profitably to consumers. Retailers could
effectively lend, and thus bypass these usury laws, by including the cost of the
loan (including the risks of nonpayment) in the purchase price. See, e.g., id.
52 Id. at 309.
53 Id.

4 Id. at 308.
s5 See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Paying with Plastic: The

Digital Revolution in Buying and Borrowing, 53-54 (MIT Press 2005).
56

Id. at 58.
11 Id. at 56-57

58 See, e.g., id.
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country. The modern credit card industry, however, did not
really take off until the early 1980s. State usury laws had
significantly constrained the expansion of credit cards during the
1970s because the cost of capital was too high to enable banks to
profitably extend credit at the interest rates allowed in many
states.5 9 This changed in 1978 when a Supreme Court decision
allowed banks to issue nationally without being subject to these
state restrictions.60 That decision, together with the economic
expansion that began in the early 1980s, allowed the development
of a robust national market for credit cards.
Over time, both computerized risk analysis and
securitization became important factors in helping to increase the
supply of revolving credit. Crude risk analysis methods tended to
deny credit to many people who failed to meet certain thresholds.
More refined risk analysis made it possible to issue credit to a
wider group of individuals. These individuals usually paid higher
fees, including higher interest rates because they had greater
expected default rates and other payment-related problems.
Lenders, therefore, developed various pricing plans to
accommodate these expanding categories of borrowers.
The increased availability of credit cards has also
provided significant benefits to small businesses. Almost half of
firms with fewer than 20 employees use personal credit cards to
help finance their businesses.6 1 That has enabled small businesses,
especially new companies that do not have a significant credit
history, to obtain sources of working capital as well as longer
term loans. Smaller retailers have also benefited from the
expansion of credit cards. Larger retailers can afford to offer store
cards along with other lending programs such as installment
sales; smaller firms, however, typically lack the financial
resources or the scale to offer their consumers credit. The
19 See Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit Card Interest
Rate Regulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 201 (1986).
60 Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,
439 U.S. 299, 318 (1978).
61BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS ON THE AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT TO SMALL BUSINESSES
30 (2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/board
docs/rptccongress/small
businesscreditlsbfreport2007.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). Almost 47% of
businesses with fewer than 500 employees rely upon personal credit cards. Id.
62 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 55, at 107-114; see also David
Blanchflower & David S. Evans, The Role of Credit Cards in Providing
Financing for Small Businesses, 77 THE PAYMENT CARD ECONOMICS
REVIEW 77 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474450.
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widespread availability of consumer credit from third parties has
retailers and helped level the playing
therefore benefited smaller
63
retailers.
larger
field with
There are debates surrounding whether Americans took
on too much debt as a result of the availability of credit cards and
over some of the pricing practices of the card issuers. These are
valid concerns that lie outside the scope of this paper and which
have been addressed by recent legislation and regulation.
However, it is important to recognize that despite these issues, a
vast number of Americans have benefited from expanded access
to loans which have enabled them to deal with emergencies and
smooth out consumption over their lifecycles. As noted below, it
has also enabled consumers to shift borrowing from more
expensive retail loans. For example, if credit cards were banned,
or sharply curtailed, many consumers would be buying furniture
on installment plans from retailers and paying much more in the
end than they pay with credit cards. Other consumers would turn
to payday lenders, pawn shops, and loan sharks.
Another major innovation was home equity loans, which
were introduced in the late 1970s.64 At that time, many
households had realized large increases in the value of their
homes. But their investments in their homes were illiquid. To
borrow, these households used primarily credit vehicles, such as
credit cards, that did not require collateral and therefore had
relatively high interest rates. With the house serving as collateral,
home equity loans allowed Americans to borrow against the
equity they had built up in their houses and at lower rates than
many other forms of credit. The value of home equity lines
increased from around $322 billion in 1990 to over $1'1 trillion in
2008 (in constant 2008 dollars).
Computerized risk analysis and securitization facilitated
the expansion of other forms of credit from the early 1980s to the
present. For example, automobile loans, for which the loan-to63

64

EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 55, at ch.3.
Louise Story, Home Equity Frenzy Was a Bank Ad Come True, N.Y.

TIMES,

Aug. 15, 2008, at Al.

Press Release, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Flow of Funds
Accounts of the United States (Sept. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). Numbers
are converted into constant 2008 dollars using GDP deflator series from
Bureau of Economic. Analysis, Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price
Deflator, Bureau of Economic Analysis, last updated Aug. 27, 2009 available
at http:/research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/dataIGDPDEF.txt (last visited Feb. 10,
65

2010.)
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value ratio is typically around 90 percent, increased from about
$254 billion in 1980 to $584 billion in 1999 (in constant 2008
66
dollars).
The expansion of non-mortgage credit as a result of the
introduction of innovative methods of lending has enabled
consumers to substitute less expensive for more expensive forms
of credit. Although there is no hard evidence we are aware of, it is
likely that the introduction by retailers of house charges and
revolving loans reduced the reliance of 19th century consumers on
the main alternative forms of credit - pawn brokers and loan
sharks. As a result, and most significantly, charge and credit
cards displaced retail credit. Between 1968 and 2008 the fraction
of non-mortgage debt from retailers declined from 17 percent to
about 2 percent while the fraction based on credit cards increased
from 1.3 percent to 38.1 percent of consumer credit.67 Credit cards
generally offered better financing terms than store programs as
well as greater variety and portability. When home equity loans
became available, consumers substituted this cheaper form of
lending for borrowing on credit cards. 68 Rates on home equity
lines are typically
lower than those on credit cards, and they offer
tax benefits. 69 This made borrowing against a person's existing
home for non-housing consumption more common.70 Of course, as
66 For 1980 numbers, see Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic
Research, Series: AUTONS, Total Automobile Credit Outstanding, available
at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/AUTONS. For 1999 numbers see
Federal Reserve Statistical Release G19 (June 7, 1999), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/19990607/ (last visited Feb. 10,
2010). Numbers are converted into constant 2008 dollars using GDP deflator
series from Bureau of Economic Analysis, supra note 65. More recent data on
the total amount of automobile loans outstanding is not publicly available.
67 Federal Reserve Statistical Release G19, Consumer Credit Historical
Data, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/hist/ (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010).
68 Michael E. Staten, Consumer Debt: Myths about the Impact of the
Recession, CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER REPRINT #21 (1993), available at
ttp://faculty.msb.edu/prog/CRC/publications2.html (last visited Feb. 9, 1010).
69 According to Bloomberg, the average lowest credit card rate was 11.25
percent as of August 19, 2009, while the rate for home equity loans was 8.55
percent according to www.bankrate.com. Jeff Plungis, Consumer Gains on
Credit-CardLaw Pared by Rate Hikes, BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 19, 2009,
available
at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&
sid=aBKkB081ypy4 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
70 Barry Z. Cynamon & Steve M. Fazzari, Household Debt in the
Consumer Age-: Source of Growth - Risk of Collapse, 3 CAPITALISM & SOC'Y 1
(2008), available at http://www.bepress.com/cas/vol3/iss2/art3 (last visited Feb.
10, 2010).
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housing values have declined, we would expect that the home
equity trend will diminish as more consumers go back to credit
cards.
C. The Effects of Financial Innovation on the Expansion and
Democratization of Credit
Financial innovations have helped relax liquidity
constraints on millions of Americans who would not have had
access to credit at all or would not have been able to get as much
credit as they desired. Professor Lyons found that in 1998,
American households were able to obtain 68.3 percent of the
credit they wanted; up from 55.5 percent in 1983. 71 That trend
has likely continued given the effects of the innovations discussed
above. As we demonstrate, access to credit has expanded socially
and economically to groups that are most likely to be liquidity
constrained.
i. Home Ownership
The growth rate in home ownership for several socially
and economically disadvantaged groups increased more rapidly
than the growth rate for better-situated groups between the late
1980s and the late 2000s. Between 1995 and 2008, the rate of
growth of home ownership for African Americans and Hispanics
was 11.0 percent and 16.6 percent respectively, compared to 5.8
percent for whites.72
This increase in home ownership for individuals trapped
in the bottom fifth of the income distribution can be attributed
largely to greater sources and access to credit capital. Between
1989 and 2007, as illustrated in Table 4, the percent of families
who owned a primary residence in the bottom quintile of the
income distribution increased from 32.9 to 41.4 percent (a change
of 8.5 percentage points); that compares with an increase from
65.4 to 69.3 percent (a change of 3.9 percentage points) for
households in the middle quintile of the income distribution.
supra note 24, at 248.
72 The percentage of African American homeowners grew from 42.7
percent in 1995 to 47.4 percent in 2008; the percentage of Hispanic
homeowners grew from 42.1 percent to 49.1 percent; the percentage of white
homeowners increased from 70.9 percent to 75 percent. See U.S. Census,
71 Lyons,

HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY OF HOUSEHOLDER: 1994

TO 2008, www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annua108/ann08t22.xls.
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Thus, the increase in home ownership was almost twice as high
for the low income group compared to the middle income group.
Consequentially, the gap between the bottom bracket and the
middle income categories decreased from 32.5 percent points (65.4
- 32.9) to 27.9 percentage points.
The percent of home ownership for single parents
increased from 42.7 percent to 49.1 percent (falling from a peak of
54.5 percent in 2004 before the housing collapse started), while
the percent of home ownership among families with children
remained roughly constant between 1989 and 2007 (increasing
slightly from 77.5 percent to 78.0 percent). The increase of 6.4
percentage points in home ownership for single parents was more
than 12 times higher than the 0.5 percentage point increase for
parents with children.
Table 4. Percent of families with primary residence, by racial, family structure,
and income characteristics
Percentile of
Race or ethnicity

Family structure

income

Age of head

Year

White,
non
Hispanic

Nonwhite
or
Hispanic

1989

70.5

44.4

42.7

77.5

32.9

65.4

39.4

76.5

1992

70.3

44.4

43.0

74.6

38.9

61.8

36.8

75.4

1995

70.6

44.3

46.8

74.6

39.7

62.6

37.9

75.3

1998

72.0

47.2

46.9

79.1

38.8

67.3

38.9

74.4

2001

74.3

47.3

48.5

78.7

40.6

66.0

39.9

76.2

2004

76.1

50.8

54.5

77.8

40.3

71.6

41.6

77.3

2007

75.6

51.9

49.1

78.0

41.4

69.3

40.7

77.3

Single
with
children

Couple
with
children

Bottom

Middle

< 35

45 - 54

Note: Bottom percentile is for people in the lowest 20 percent and middle
quintile is for people in 40-5 9 percent range.
Source: THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, 2007 SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCE, (2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/Oss2/2007/2007%20SCF%2OChartbook.pdf.

Between 1989 and 2007, all groups experienced an
increase in the value of their homes. As reported by the Survey of
Consumer Finances, the gap between the value of the homes
afforded by lower and middle class people shrunk between 1989
and 2007. 71 In 1989, the average value of the home for the lowest
11Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Survey of Consumer Finance,
1992-2007,
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/
scfindex.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
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income quintile was half of the value of a home for the middle
quintile.74 In 2007, the median home value for the lowest quintile
is only 50 percent lower than that for the middle.7 5 The median
value of the home owned by African Americans and Hispanics
only 66
increased by 125 percent compared to an increase 7 of
6
people.
white
by
owned
homes
of
value
the
percent for
These increases in home ownership were made possible
because of the increased availability of mortgage finance. Table 5
shows the percent of households with mortgages or home equity
loans for each of the groups discussed above. Between 1989 and
2007 the share of Hispanics and African Americans with
mortgages increased 10.6 percentage points (39.2-28.6) compared
to an increase of 7.2 percent points for white. Similarly, the
percent of lower income people with mortgages almost doubled
from 7.5 percent to 13.7 percent.
Table 5. Percent of families with mortgages or home-equity loans
Race or ethnicity

White,
non
Hispanic

Year

Nonwhite
or
Hispanic

Family structure

Single

Couple

with
children

with
children

Percentile of
income

Bottom

Middle

Age of head of
house

< 35

45

-

54

1989

42.0

28.6

30.8

62.2

7.5

37.3

34.9

56.9

1992

42.1

27.3

28.3

63.2

10.4

35.4

30.9

59.4

1995

43.3

30.2

32.0

63.0

10.4

37.7

32.9

61.1

1998

45.5

30.3

28.9

65.5

10.8

42.5

32.9

57.6

2001

46.1

35.1

34.1

67.0

12.8

43.1

35.6

58.7

2004

49.7

36.3

41.3

66.5

14.6

50

37.7

62.5

2007

49.2

39.2

37.0

67.8

13.7

48.8

37.1

63.8

Note: Bottom percentile is for people in the lowest 20 percent and middle
quintile is for people in 40-59 percent range.
Source: 2007 Survey of Consumer Finance, The Federal Reserve Board (June
15, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2007/2007
%20SCF%2OChartbook.pdf.

74 Id.
75Id.
76

Id.
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ii. Access to Non-Housing Credit
Socially and economically disadvantaged groups also
secured greater access to non-mortgage credit between 1989 and
2007. Tables 6-9 summarize the changes and overall growth rates
for the groups discussed above for automobile ownership,
education loans, credit card loans and home equity loans.
Between 1989 and 2007, the percentage of non-white
households with automobile loans increased from 29.3 percent to
33.3 percent while the share of white households with auto loans
decreased slightly following a peak of 37.4 percent in 2004 (see
Table 6). The share of single parents with vehicles loans
increased from 26.9 percent to 28.3 percent while the share of
married couples with car loans dropped to 50.4 percent following
an increase to 51.1 percent in 2004. Similar observations can be
made for lower income and younger people.
Table 6. Percent of families with vehicle installment loans

Race or ethnicity

Family structure

Percentile of

Age of head

income

White,

Nonwhite

Single

non

or

with

with

Hispanic

Hispanic

children

children

Year

Couple
Bottom

Middle

< 35

45 - 54

1989

36.6

29.3

26.9

50.7

11.5

41.5

37.8

47.6

1992

31.4

24.9

25.1

44.1

10.0

33.5

36.6

34.6

1995

32.9

27.6

24.0

47.6

11.2

34.3

40.1

37.9

1998

32.0

29.4

27.1

44.2

12.4

37.1

36.9

40.1

2001

35.9

32.1

34.5

50.9

12.3

42.0

45.0

37.8

2004

37.4

30.9

30.9

51.1

12.8

43.6

41.3

39.0

2007

35.5

33.3

28.3

50.4

13.0

41.1

44.3

39.1

Note: Bottom percentile is for people in the lowest 20 percent and middle
quintile is for people in 40-59 percent range.
Source: THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, 2007 SURVEY OF CONSUMER
(2009),
FINANCE,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2007/2007%20SCF%20Chartboo

k.pdf.

The increased access to credit also provided minority
groups with improved access to education loans as evidenced by
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Table 7. Between 1989 and 2007, the proportion of non-white
households holding education loans increased 7.7 percent points
(from 10.8 percent to 18.5 percent) compared with an increase of
only 5.6 percent points for white households (from 8.3 percent to
13.9 percent).
Table 7. Percent of families with education installment loans
Race or ethnicity

Year

White,
non
Hispanic

Non-white
or
Hispanic

Family structure
Single
with
children

Couple with
children

Percentile of
income
Bottom

Middle

Age of head
< 35

5
54

1989

8.3

10.8

17.0

8.9

8.4

7.7

17.1

7.3

1992

10.8

10.3

15.0

13.5

10.6

14.1

24.3

5.4

1995

11.6

12.7

13.7

17.3

9.5

11.4

24.4

11.3

1998

11.4

11.4

13.6

14.4

9.9

11.7

23.6

10.3

2001

11.2

13.5

14.3

14.9

7.7

13.6

26.1

11.0

2004

13.7

12.9

14.4

18.0

10.9

15.8

28.6

12.6

2007

13.9

18.5

20.2

20.7

10.7

16.6

33.8

14.5

Note: Bottom percentile is for people in the lowest 20 percent and -middle
quintile is for people in 40-59 percent range.
Source: THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, 2007 SURVEY OF CONSUMER
FINANCE,

(2009),

http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2007/2007%20SCF%2OChartboo
k.pdf.

The gap between minority groups holding credit cards and
the rest of the population also declined. The gap in having
revolving credit between white and nonwhite households
disappeared between 1989 and 2007. Meanwhile, the gaps
between single parents and couples with children and between
the lowest and middle income quintiles also declined dramatically
over this period as shown on Table 8.
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Table 8. Percent of families with credit card balances
Race or ethnicity
Year

White,
non
Hispanic

Nonwhite
or
Hispanic

Family structure
Single
with
children

Percentile of

income

Couple
with
children

Bottom

Age of

head-

Middle

< 35

45 - 54

1989

41.5

34.4

35.6

53.8

15.3

48.9

44.5

49.3

1992

44.2

42.1

43.3

56.0

23.4

51.9

51.8

48.9

1995

47.1

48.0

43.9

60.9

26.0

52.9

54.7

56.4

1998

44.3

43.5

38.0

55.8

24.5

50.1

50.7

52.5

2001

43.3

47.6

48.1

52.4

30.3

52.8

49.6

50.4

2004

46.0

46.7

48.6

56.7

28.8

55.1

47.5

54.0

2007

45.1

48.4

45.1

54.7

25.7

54.9

48.5

53.6

Note: Bottom percentile is for people in the lowest 20 percent and middle
quintile is for people in 40-59 percent range.
Source: THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, 2007 SURVEY OF CONSUMER
FINANCE, (2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2007/2007%20
SCF%20Chartbook.pdf.

Similar trends are also observed for home equity lines of
credit. As homeownership increased and home equity lines of
credit became available in the 1980s, more households were
taking advantage of their home's equity (see Table 9). In 2007,
5.5 percent of non-white households had access to a home equity
line versus only 1.2 percent in 1989. From 1989 to 2007, the
proportion of single parents with home equity lines increased
from 0.8 percent to 6.4 percent. Furthermore, a greater number of
younger people were using home equity loans to finance
purchases. In 2008, 4 percent of individuals under 35 had home
equity lines of credit versus only 0.8 percent in 1989.
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Table 9. Percent of families with home equity lines of credit
Race or ethnicity
Year

White,
non
Hispanic

Nonwhite
or
Hispanic

Family structure
Single
with
children

Couple
with
children

Percentile of
income
Bottom

Middle

Age of
head
< 35

45 - 54

1989

3.8

1.2

0.8

5.5

0.1

2.4

0.8

6.2

1992

5.2

1.4

1.3

7.0

0.0

3.7

1.1

8.3

1995

3.3

1.4

0.9

4.7

0.0

1.4

1.4

5.1

1998

5.0

2.6

2.7

7.4

0.5

3.3

1.4

7.9

2001

5.7

1.9

2.0

7.3

1.0

3.0

2.9

7.2

2004

10.5

3.6

5.6

13.6

1.3

7.1

3.5

13.1

2007

9.8

5.5

6.4

11.0

1.9

6.9

4.0

11.7

Note: Bottom percentile is for people in the lowest 20 percent and middle
quintile is for people in 40-59 percent range.
Source:

THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, 2007 SURVEY OF CONSUMER

FINANCE, (2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2007/2007%20
SCF%20Chartbook.pdf.

D. The Effects of Financial Innovation on Economic
Expansion and Job Growth
The increased supply of credit to households that began in
the early 1980s helped spur economic expansion and job growth
for several decades. Widespread increases in available credit
created more funds available for consumption and investment,
which then increased demand for goods. To meet this growing
demand, firms start producing more goods, which created job
opportunities; employment rates therefore rose along with wages,
which increased overall disposable income to consumers. The
increased income further stimulated consumption and supply of
goods. Thus, the initial consumption stimulation started a
cascading chain of further spending and subsequent production
growth, which led to overall economic growth. Economists call
this mechanism "the multiplier effect." 77

7 For more discussion about the multiplier effect, see generally PAUL
SAMUELSON & WILLIAM NORDHAUS, supra note 17, at 446.
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IV. The Rationalefor the Consumer FinancialProtectionAgency
Act of 2009
Although consumer lending has benefited millions of
Americans, it has not been without its problems. As with almost
any industry, some firms engage in unscrupulous or even
fraudulent practices. Some consumers borrow with incomplete or
imperfect information. The U.S. Congress has passed numerous
laws, including the Truth in Lending Act and the FTC Act, to
regulate various aspects of lending including disclosure
requirements. Various states have also passed laws to protect
borrowers, including state consumer protection legislation, usury
laws, and restrictions on payday lending and other forms of
lending. As a result, consumer lending is already extensively
regulated in the United States.
The U.S. Department of Treasury has proposed sweeping
changes to this system of regulation. In announcing the plan,
President Obama said that consumer financial protection was
needed because "crisis was not just the result of decisions made
by the mightiest of financial firms; it was also the result of
decisions made by ordinary Americans to open credit cards and
78
take out home loans and take on other financial obligations.
The Treasury Department argued that mortgage companies as
well as other financial firms sold products that "were overly
complicated and unsuited to borrowers' financial situation[s]...
79
with disastrous results for consumers and the financial system.
The Treasury Department's report does not, however, provide
evidence to support the naked assertion that failed consumer
protection regulation played a significant factor in the financial
crisis. Indeed, there is no evidence that we are aware of that such
predatory lending or other practices that would violate consumer
protection laws resulted in a significant portion of the loss in
value of the mortgage-backed securities that were at the heart of
the financial meltdown.80 There is therefore little basis for
78 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Speech on 21st Century
Financial
Regulatory
Reform
(June
17,
2009),
available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/19658/obamasspeech-on-21st-centuryfinanc
ialregulatory-reform.html.
79

DEP'T OF THE TRES., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW

FOUNDATION, available at

http://www.financialstabilit.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf.
'0 That is not to deny that some consumers were victims of unfair and
deceptive practices in securing mortgages and that the regulatory agencies
could and should have done a better job regulating the burgeoning subprime
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concluding that increased consumer protection in the mortgage
market would have prevented the financial crisis, that failed
consumer protection was a significant cause of the financial crisis,
or that the changes sought by the CFPA Act would have averted
or even meaningfully reduced the harm from the financial crisis.
To the extent an intellectual case has been made for the
new agency, it has been made by several law professors in a series
of articles that appeared in 2008. Their arguments are largely
based on a belief that consumers make poor choices when it
comes to financial products and services. These professors also
suggest that stronger consumer protection regulation could make
these consumers better off by regulating the design of these
products, mandating various disclosures, restricting consumer
mortgage market. There is no evidence that we are aware of, however, that a
significant portion of the individuals who defaulted were victims of
unscrupulous mortgage practices or that these individuals would have failed to
take out mortgages in the absence of these practices. Oren Bar-Gill and
Elizabeth Warren have argued that "the high proportion of people with good
credit scores who ended up with high-cost mortgages raises the specter that
some portion of these consumers were not fully cognizant of the fact that they
could have borrowed for much less." See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren,
Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 39 (2008). They claim that many
people who got sub-prime mortgages could have received less expensive prime
mortgages. These authors do not provide any evidence that a significant
number of homeowners that defaulted would not have done so had they paid
lower interest rates. It is doubtful that there would have been fewer defaults
since even with lower interest rates these homeowners would have had
negative equity in their homes and therefore would gain from defaulting. In
addition, a Federal Reserve Bank of Boston study finds that most subprime
mortgage borrowers would not have received prime mortgages. Christopher L.
Foote, Kristopher S. Gerardi, Lorenz Goette & Paul Willen, Subprime Facts:
What (We Think) We Know about the Subprime Crisis and What We Don't
(Federal Reserve Board of Boston, Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 08-2,
May 30, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153411. Deterioration of
the underwriting standards has also been put to blame for the current crisis.
Another study at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston found that loans issued
in 2005-2006 were not very different from loans made earlier, which, in turn
had performed well, despite carrying a variety of serious risk factors. While the
2005-2006 loans may have carried risk factors, such as increased leverage,
underwriting standards alone cannot explain the dramatic rise in foreclosures.
See Kristopher S. Gerardi, Andreas Lehnert, Shane Sherland & Paul Willen,
Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis (Federal Reserve Board of Boston,
Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 09-1, December 22, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341853; see also Geetesh Bhardwaj & Rajdeep
Sengupta, Where's the Smoking Gun? A Study of Underwriting Standardsfor
US Subprime Mortgages (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper
No. 2008-036B, Apr. 1, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1286106.
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choice, and 'nudging' consumers toward certain standardized
financial products.
The CFPA Act appears to have evolved from a May 2008
paper written by two law professors: Elizabeth Warren of
Harvard" l and Oren Bar-Gill of New York University.12 They
identified a series of problems with consumer financial products,
argued that existing federal regulatory agencies lack the ability or
motivation to deal with these problems, and proposed the
creation of a new federal consumer financial protection agency.83
Along with several co-authors, Michael Barr, a University of
Michigan Law School professor who is now the Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury involved in the draft legislation,
expanded upon the proposed Bar-Gill/Warren agency by
detailing key aspects of the regulatory approach the agency
should take in an October 2008 paper.8 4 Barr et al. proposed
requiring that lenders offer standardized products designed by
the agency regulators.
Further, Barr et al. would enable
individuals to sue lenders if certain substantive terms of financial
products,
including
disclosure
terms,
were
deemed
"unreasonable." ' 6 These papers provide the articulated basis for
understanding the rationale behind the CFPA Act as envisioned
by its architects, insight into how the new agency would analyze
consumer lending products, and a means to predict how the new
agency would affect people's access to consumer credit and their
choice of products. In the absence of concrete guidelines
specifying how the broad discretionary authority granted to the
new agency will be exercised, these papers provide the most
reliable basis to predict how the CFPA will operate in practice.
The proposed new consumer financial protection agency,
as described by these authors, is based on the following set of
"1Elizabeth Warren is currently the head of the Congressional Oversight
Panel on TARP funding.
82 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 80. Bar-Gill and Warren's case for
the CFPA Act relies heavily on their previous work. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill,
Seduction By Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004); Elizabeth Warren,
Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY: J. OF IDEAS (2007), available at

http://www.democracyjournal.org/article.php?ID=6528.
83 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 80, at 26.
84 Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, & Eldar Shafir, BEHAVIORALLY
INFORMED FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION (New American Foundation

Working
Paper,
behavioralv5.pdf..
85 Id.
at 7-9.
86 Id. at 9, 15.

2008),

http://www.newamerica.net/files/naf_
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markets,

and

" "[m]any consumers are uninformed and
irrational,"87
" "consumers make systematic mistakes in their
choice of credit products and in the use of these
products,""8 and,
" regulations should adopt a number of
"behaviorally informed" policies designed to
address
the
consequences
of consumer
89
ignorance and irrationality.
This view of consumers, and the policy recommendations
that follow, are in turn based on the "behavioral law and
economics" literature.9 0 This literature consists of a number of
studies in economics and psychology that find that consumers
appear to make various systematic mistakes evaluating
probabilities and discounting future values, and, further, that
consumers make various choices that appear inconsistent with
each other.
Members of the behavioral law and economics school
typically believe that these studies provide a basis for government
interventions in the market to prevent consumers from harming
themselves. Some members advocate "soft paternalism" that
'nudges' consumers towards what certain scholars deem to be
better choices.9 1 Such 'nudges' often take the form of default rules
which map onto the policy preferences of the academic advocate.
Professors Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, for example, have
advocated that businesses make 401-(k) plans "opt out" to nudge
consumers to invest in these plans and thereby overcome what
Sunstein and Thaler perceive as a tendency to irrationally
overemphasize current consumption over long-term saving.
87

Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 80, at 21.

18

Id. at 26.

See generally Barr et al., supra note 844, at 1.
For a summary of this literature, see Christine Jolls, BehavioralLaw and
Economics, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Peter
Diamond
ed.,
Princeton
University
Press
2007), available at
http://www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=959177;
Christine
Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
90

91 See Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (Yale University Press 2008).
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Other behavioral law and economics scholars advocate "hard
paternalism" that renders disfavored choices impractical or
illegal, even between willing and informed consumers and
providers.12 "Hard paternalism" includes recently proposed "sin"
or "vice" taxes aimed at reducing the consumption of junk food,
soda, and cigarettes. 3
Behavioral law and economics scholars favoring both
"soft" and "hard" forms of paternalism, usually take a dim view
of consumer borrowing. They believe that consumers
systematically over-value current consumption and do not
adequately account for the costs of repayment in the future. 4
Some members of this school therefore advocate a variety of
prohibitions on consumer lending, including banning subprime
mortgages;95 prohibiting credit cards; 96 applying state usury laws
to credit cards;97 and requiring the unbundling of transacting and
financing services offered by credit card companies so that
consumers could not use the same card to make a purchase and
then finance it.98
Economists generally agree that consumers do not carry
out the perfectly rational computations that theoretical models
usually assume. However, there is considerable controversy over
whether many of the findings relied on by behavioral law and
economics scholars are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of
fashioning policy recommendations. Many of the findings are
based on laboratory experiments in which students or other test
subjects are asked to complete some hypothetical exercise.
Economists have found that some of these findings are simply the
artifact of how questions are posed to the test subjects,99 while
92 See,

e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 80, at 21; Eyal Zamir, The
Efficiency of Paternalism,84 VA. L. REV. 229, 230-32 (1998); Orly Lobel & On
Amir, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How BehavioralEconomics Informs Law and
Policy (reviewing THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 91); Jonathan Gruber,
Smoking's 'Internalities,'25 REGULATION 52 (2002-2003).

See Gruber, supra note 92.
14See Bar-Gill, supra note 82, at 1395-1404.
"ISee generally Alan M. White, The Case for Banning Subprime
Mortgages, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 617 (2008) (expounding upon banning several
"subprime" lending practices because, amongst other grounds, consumers
systematically over-value present-day consumption to future detriment).
96 See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, We Can Do This the
Easy Way or the Hard Way: Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 204 (2006) (advocating a ban on credit cards).
91Id. at 1426-28.
13

98Id.

'9Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay-Willingness
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others have argued that the authors of these studies have not
adequately explored whether there is a rational explanation for
their findings. 00 As Professor David Levine of the California
Institute of Technology has observed, "While behavioral
economics points to many paradoxes and problems with
mainstream economics, their own models and claims are often not
subject to a great deal of scrutiny."1 1
Although we believe that regulators and policymakers
should be aware of some of these new behavioral studies, and
may even find useful insights from them, there is hardly a
consensus among economists that these studies or their findings
are sufficiently robust or accepted to provide the basis for
regulators to substitute their judgments for consumers. 102
Unfortunately, many of the behavioral law and economics
to Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect," Subject Misconceptions and
Experimental Proceduresfor Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530
(2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=615861
("The primary conclusion derived from the data reported here is that observed
WTP-WTA gaps do not reflect a fundamental feature of human preferences.
That is, endowment effect theory does not seem to explain observed gaps. In
addition, our results suggest that observed gaps should not be interpreted as
support for prospect theory").
100David Levine, Is Behavioral Economics Doomed: The Ordinary Versus
the Extraordinary, Max Weber Lecture (June 8, 2009), available at
http://www.dklevine.com/papers/behavioral-doomed.pdf. See also John List,
Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace,
72 ECONOMETRICA 615 (2004) (arguing that laboratory results are not robust

to market interactions where competition, expertise, and learning might be
expected to ameliorate these biases); John A. List, Does Market Experience
Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118
Q. J.
ECON. 41
(2003),
http://www.nber.org/-rosenbla/econ31 1/syllabus/listendowmenteffect.pdf
(arguing the same); Michael S. Haigh & John A. List, Do Professional Traders
Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis, 60 J. FIN. 523
(2005) (arguing the same); John A. List & Uri Gneezy, Putting Behavioral
Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field
Experiments, 74 ECONOMETRICA 5 (2006), http://rady.ucsd.edu/faculty/
directory/gneezy/docs/behavioral-economics.pdf (arguing the same); Plott &
Zeiler, supra note 10099, at 1 (finding that the existence and magnitude of the
"endowment effect" to be a function of experimental procedures and subject
misconception rather than individual preferences); Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin
McCabe, Keith Shachat & Vernon Smith, Preferences, Property Rights, and
Anonymity in Bargaining Games, 7 GAMES AND EcON. BEHAV. 346 (1992),
available at http://www.neuroeconomics.net/article.php/433.html (arguing that
experimental results themselves are the product of experimental procedures
and subject misconception rather than individual preferences).
10I

See Levine, supra note 101, at 10.

102

Id.
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scholars, including the developers of the CFPA, have leapt from a
limited and controversial set of academic studies to radical
proposals in which the government substitutes consumer
decisions with its own preferences. As Professor Jeffrey
Rachlinski of Cornell University School of Law notes, "virtually
every scholar who has written on the application of psychological
research on judgment and choice to law has concluded that
cognitive psychology supports institutional constraint on
individual choice."103
In concluding that regulators can (and would) make better
choices than consumers, behavioral law and economics
proponents tend to forget that regulators are human and subject
to some of the same "cognitive biases" as everyday consumers.c 1
Judge Richard Posner, among other critics, has argued that
because regulators are just as likely to suffer from cognitive
biases as consumers, regulatory 'nudges' have significant
potential to do more harm than good. 10 5 Regulators are, moreover,
typically insulated from the incentives to mitigate these errors
through education or other means that private actors face in
competitive markets.
The CFPA Act is predicated on the view that consumers
frequently make irrational decisions especially when it comes to
financial products and that the government would make better
decisions for consumers and should establish a "supernanny" to
protect consumers from themselves. These advocates have not
made an adequate case for this radical approach to government
intervention in the market.
There is a further concern. The legal scholars who have
proposed and designed the CFPA follow in the tradition of the
1 9 th century moralists who believed that credit was the "great
tempter.' '0 6 These scholars believe that borrowing money imposes
great costs on consumers without providing sufficient
concomitant benefits. Therefore, these scholars favor regulations
that sharply constrain the ability of consumers to borrow money.
103Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for
Paternalism,97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (2003).
104 Most of the experimental evidence that shows "irrational" behavior has
been conducted with college and graduate students and is perhaps more
representative of the college-educated people who work at regulatory agencies
than the average American who borrows money.
105 Richard Posner, Treating Financial Consumers as Consenting Adults,
WALL ST. J., July 22, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB

10001424052970203946904574302213213148166.html.
106 BACHELLER, supra note 22, at 116.
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They also share the hubris of the 1 9 th century moralists in
believing that they are in a better position to make consumer
borrowing decisions than the consumers themselves. Irving
Bacheller's 1912 screed, Charge It!, expounded this philosophy in
no uncertain terms. Railing against the "evils of credit," Bacheller
argued against one of the financial innovations of the early 2 0 th
he insisted would
century - the personal checkbook - which
10 7
tempt consumers to spend too much money.
V. Effects of the CFPA Act on Access to Consumer Credit and
Economic Performance
The Treasury's CFPA Act of 2009 would likely inflict
significant collateral damage on consumers, small businesses and
the economy. It would:
" reverse
the long-term trend towards
the
democratization of credit that has especially
helped socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals;
" reduce the number of jobs created in the economy
by making it harder for the new firms that create
most jobs to access critical consumer credit; and,
" slow economic growth through reduced consumer
spending and job creation.
Under plausible yet conservative assumptions the CFPA
could also:
" increase the interest rates consumers pay by 160
basis points;
" reduce consumer borrQwing by at least 2.1 percent;
and,
" reduce the net new jobs created in the economy by
4.3 percent.
These impacts would lead to a significant long-term drag on
economic performance, and simultaneously slow economic
recovery.
This section explains the basis for these conclusions. Our
analysis proceeds in four steps: Part A provides an overview of
the major provisions of the CFPA Act. It shows that the Act
would lead to a radical change in consumer protection law in

107

Id.
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addition to creating a highly intrusive agency that would impose
significant costs on lenders. Part B examines the impact of the
provisions of the CFPA on the cost of providing credit and the
availability of new and existing lending products. Part B finds
that a combination of increased litigation exposure and increased
regulatory compliance would likely increase the cost of providing
credit products. It could also result in credit products being
withdrawn from the market altogether which inherently deters
the introduction and advancement of new, innovative products.
Part C shows that under plausible assumptions, these increases in
costs and restrictions in innovative products could lead to a
significant increase in the cost of credit, a reduction in credit
availability, and a significant loss of jobs. Lastly, Part D explores
the implications of a CFPA-induced credit crunch on the overall
economy.
A. Overview of the CFPA Act
There are two broad aspects of the CFPA Act that will
affect the lending market. First, the CFPA Act would radically
change existing laws on consumer financial protection. Second,
the CFPA Act would create a new agency that would have the
power to become directly and significantly involved in
determining whether, how, and on what terms covered businesses
would be able to provide credit to consumers.
i. Legal Changes
The CFPA Act would limit the federal preemption of
consumer protection regulation of nationally chartered financial
institutions.10 8 Specifically, the CFPA Act allows states and
municipalities to adopt more stringent regulations than those
adopted by the CFPA.10 9 Rather than providing a uniform set of
regulations governing financial consumer protection, the CFPA
effectively provides a "floor" on regulation, exposing banks to
substantial compliance costs. 10 The Treasury Department's
FinancialRegulatory Reform plan seems to suggest even further
that the CFPA would actively encourage state and local
CFPA Act, supra note 1, at § 1041(a(1).
Id. at § 104 1(b).
11 Id. The CFPA Act also provides for consultation between the proposed
Agency and state Attorneys General for potential simultaneous suits under the
CFPA Act and more stringent state law. Id. at § 1042(b).
'0
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enforcement actions."' Consumer protection requirements for
lending products could therefore vary across states and possibly
municipalities. 112 Moreover, historically the FTC has imposed
important restraints on the judicial interpretation of state
consumer protection legislation, encouraging uniformity among
states and consistency with federal consumer protection
regulation as well as reducing the possibility of interpretations
that are not in consumers' best interests. The CFPA Act would
limit those constraints and thereby permit a greater degree of
variety and inconsistency in regulations.1 13
The CFPA Act would also change consumer protection
laws as applied to financial products. The new agency is
authorized to take action to "prevent a person from committing or
engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice under
Federal law in connection with any transaction with a consumer
for a consumer financial product or service.""' 4 The new agency is
not required to define which practices are "unfair" or "deceptive"
in a manner that comports with longstanding and continually
developing jurisprudence guided by the Federal Trade
Commission under Section 5 of the FTC Act."' Moreover, the
term "abusive" is new to the federal and state consumer
protection landscape and thus the CFPA Act of 2009 creates a
new legal theory under which lending practices can be found
unlawful if deemed "abusive" to consumers. 1 6 Further, while the*
...
New Foundation, supra note 1, at 50-5 1.
112 CFPA Act, supra note 1, at § 1041(b).
113 See Henry Butler & Jason Johnson, Consumer Harm Acts? An
Economic Analysis of State Consumer Protection Acts (Northwestern Law &
Economics Research Working Paper, No. 08-02, Apr. 24, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1125305.
114 CFPA Act, supra note 1, at § 1031.
115 Id. at § 1031(c). Specifically, the proposed Agency merely needs to
"consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other
evidence" in concluding whether or not a given business practice is "unfair"
under the CFPA Act. Id. At least one Federal Trade Commissioner has
expressed concerns about this feature of the CFPA. See William E. Kovacic,
Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, Statement on the Proposal to
Create a Consumer Financial Protection Agency to the Committee on Energy
and Commerce and the Committee on Financial Services .(July 28, 2009),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speechesfkovacic/090728stmtrecord.pdf.
Commissioner Kovacic notes that "conflicts in interpretation and in litigation
strategies, along with an increase in litigation over jurisdictional questions,
will adversely affect every core area of consumer protection for which the FTC
will continue to exercise primary responsibility."
116

CFPA Act, supra note 1, at § 1031.
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CFPA's ability to declare a practice "unfair" requires at least a
superficial analysis of its costs and benefits, no such requirement
exists with respect to its powers to identify and impose sanctions
'
against practices it deems "abusive." 17
The CFPA Act also
provides for a new "reasonableness" standard under which
lenders could be liable if they have not provided "reasonable"
disclosures to consumers.'
The combination of creating a floor for state and
municipal regulation, adding the abusive practices and
reasonableness standard, and reopening the interpretation of
unfair and deceptive practices is a toxic brew. Such changes
would likely subject lenders to regulations that vary across
geographic lines, thereby fostering uncertainty over how diverse
federal, state, and municipal regulators, and ultimately, the
courts will define unfair, deceptive, abusive, and reasonable
practices. We return to the cost implications of these legal
changes below.
ii. The New Agency
As discussed above, the CFPA would have the ability to
impose administrative fines and other sanctions based on its
interpretation of what constitutes "unfair, deceptive or abusive"
practices and whether lenders have acted reasonably. Within this
legal framework, the proposed CFPA would have far-reaching
authority to ban consumer lending products, to require lenders to
offer products designed by the CFPA, and to require extensive
disclosures.
Banning products. The CFPA would have the authority to
restrict or ban consumer lending products." 9 Given the express
disapproval of the proponents of the CFPA of widely used
lending products such as subprime mortgages and credit cards,
the CFPA would likely use its authority to prevent consumers
from obtaining access to products that the consumers want but
that the CFPA subjectively believes are bad for them. Professor
Barr and his co-authors, for example, have suggested that the
government should "specify terms and conditions that are 'safe'
and qualify for being offered as a standard credit card." At the
same time, they argue for restricting consumer access to credit
Id. at § 103 1(c).
Id. at §§ 1041(a)(1)-(a)(2).
1d. at §§ 1031, 1037.
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cards that do not meet the government-imposed requirements,
disclosure is found to have
and for "increased liability risk if12the
0
fact.
the
after
been unreasonable"
Mandated provision of "plain vanilla products". Under the
Administration's plan, the CFPA could consider requiring
lenders to make "plain vanilla" products of the CFPA's design
available to the consumer.' 2 ' The agency could insist that
consumers explicitly reject the "plain
vanilla" product before the
122
product.
own
its
offer
could
lender
Regulatory review of new products. The CFPA could
subject new products to an extensive review process, including
one in which the CFPA must approve mandatory disclosure
language for the product. 123 The CFPA could also require firms to
provide detailed information on consumer choices, including
"warnings to consumers about the heightened risks" of using
4
alternative products not pre-approved by the CFPA 1
B. Effect of the CFPA Act on the Cost of Providing Credit
and the Availability of Consumer Lending Products
i. Impact of Costs
These provisions of the CFPA would likely raise the cost
of providing credit significantly. We begin with the legal changes.
To begin, it is important to recognize that any new regulation, no
matter how simple or well intended, can result in (or add to) a
mass of conflicting interpretations and litigation, the net result of
which is higher costs and greater uncertainty for covered
25
businesses. The Truth in Lending Act provides a good example.
A week before the law became effective in 1969 there were 34
official interpretations of the regulation. Ten years later, federal
courts were inundated with more than 13,000 Truth-in-Lending
lawsuits. By early 1980, the Federal Reserve Board had
120 Barr

et al., supra note 84, at 15.

,21
CFPA Act, supra note 1, at § 1036(b)(1).
122 Id. at §§ 1036(b)(1)(B); 1036(b)(2).
123 Id. at §§ 1032(a); 1034(a), (b).
124 Id. at § 1036(b)(1)(A).
125See Thomas A. Durkin, The Impact of the Consumer Financial
Protection Agency Act on Small Business, US CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
MAGAZINE, Sept. 23, 2009, available at http://www.uschambermagazine.com/
publications/reports/090923_cfpasb.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
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published more than 1,500 interpretations attempting to provide
some clarity to minimize the uncertainty created by the varying
decisions made by the courts. Today, compliance with the Truthin-Lending law requires a great deal of resources. The CFPA Act
is likely to lead to a bureaucratic and legal mess far greater than
the Truth-in-Lending Law generated. That is because the CFPA
Act is a much more expansive and far-reaching piece of
legislation, and, most importantly, unlike the Truth-in-Lending
law, the CFPA Act provides for the states and municipalities to
have their own laws and regulations which will also require
interpretation.
The CFPA Act would also result in financial institutions
facing significant legal costs for lawsuits emanating from states
and localities. To begin with, the states could sue lenders under
Section 1031 of the CFPA Act which prohibits "unfair,"
"deceptive," or "abusive" lending practices."' Other industries
that have been exposed to state litigation have incurred
significant costs as a result, which they have had to pass on to
consumers." 7 Consumers of pharmaceutical products have
incurred costs in the tens of billions of dollars as a result of state
product liability litigation according to one study.""
Lenders would also face significant costs in the form of
hesitant reactions in the face of considerable uncertainty. It could
take years for lenders to fully understand how the courts will
ultimately define unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices; and
what constitutes a reasonable disclosure of information. During
126CFPA

Act, supra note 1, at § 1031.
!" See Professor Michael J. Saks' letter to Sen. Ernest Hollings, S. 687.
The Product Liability Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Consumer of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United State Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, first session, September
23, 1993, 126. Even though the average price effect of liability costs may be
small across industries, in some sectors it can be quite large. See Tomas J.
Philipson & Eric Sun, Is the Food and Drug Administration Safe and
Effective?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 94-95 (2008) (suggesting that the
deadweight losses to consumers and producers from the price increase due to
product liability litigation in the pharmaceutical industry is in the tens of
billions of dollars); Paul Rubin & Joanna Shepherd, Tort Reform and
Accidental Deaths, 50 J.L. & ECON. 221 (2007) (estimating that product
liability has increased accidental deaths by raising the prices of safetyenhancing goods and services); Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort
Law and the Marketfor Childhood Vaccines, 37 J. L. & ECON. 247, 273 (1994)
(suggesting that the price of vaccines went up twenty-fold after product
liability imposed).
121 See Philipson & Sun, supra note 128.
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this period, lenders would have difficulty assessing what they are
required to do under the new law or what their financial exposure
would be for failing to meet legal requirements across diverse
geographic lines. In addition, the exposure to state and local
litigation would pose the possibility that financial institutions
would face penalties that could lead to severe losses or even
bankruptcy. Businesses, of course, must be compensated for
bearing risk and uncertainty.
As noted above, the CFPA Act simultaneously opens
consumer financial protection to diverse and inconsistent state
and local regulation, allows regulators to adopt new
interpretations of traditional consumer protection terms such as
unfair and deceptive practices, and adds new concepts of abuse
and reasonableness which are undefined in the consumer credit
context. These three features have a multiplier effect and would
likely result in exponential increases in the cost and uncertainty
of complying with consumer financial protection laws and
regulations.
In addition to these changes in the legal landscape and
governance of financial institutions, the CFPA Act would likely
also impose other significant costs on consumer lending products
and providers of those products. Each new loan would require
additional paperwork and other compliance costs. This increase
in paperwork is not merely speculative. According to the Act,
"The Agency may on a periodic basis... require reports from a
covered person for purposes of ensuring compliance with the
requirements of this title, the enumerated consumer protection
laws, and any rules prescribed by the Agency..." 12 9 In granting
the proposed Agency broad powers to create rules, this provision
single-handedly allows for potentially unlimited reporting on an
undefined amount of unwritten administrative regulations.
The intensive review process envisioned by the CFPA Act
would be particularly expensive for new products. 3 ' Firms
introducing new products often make numerous subsequent
adjustments in their designs in response to feedback from
consumers and as they learn about the performance of those
products and consumer preferences. Providers of new consumer
financial products would have to submit these products to the
CFPA's review process before they have gotten any market
feedback and, in effect, before these products were "fully baked."
29 CFPA Act, supra note
30 Id. at § 1036(b)(1).

1, at § 1022(c)(1).
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Normal changes in product design following the introduction of
the lending product could expose the firm to administrative or
enforcement actions unless submitted to the CFPA beforehand
for further review and approval, exponentially delaying a firm's
ability to offer consumers improved products. The lack of
consumer experience is also a problem for the agency which
would be making judgments on disclosure and other issues with
at best limited information from consumers. As Federal Trade
Commissioner Thomas J. Rosch has noted, "there is no evidence
that this proposed new agency has any core competency in
It is
protecting consumers in the financial marketplace."''
therefore likely that the CFPA Act's "plain vanilla" requirements
would induce consumers to take products that would be inferior
to those the consumers would have chosen on their own."3 The
CFPA Act would therefore likely impose a significant increase in
the costs and risks of introducing new products.
The "plain vanilla" requirement is likely to impose even
further costs and risks on lenders. Consider a lender that
introduces a new lending product. The lender determines
whether the introduction of that product will generate enough
profit to justify its investment in the product along with its
exposure to litigation and regulatory costs. Suppose the lender
determines that, before taking into account the effect of the "plain
vanilla" requirement, it would be profitable to make a particular
product available to consumers. Now the lender must factor in
the CFPA's decisions -on a "plain vanilla" product. Some, and
perhaps many, consumers may decide to take the "plain vanilla"
version. That version may be less profitable than the version
designed by the lender. As a result, the new product may not
yield an adequate return when the profits from both the product
designed by the lender and the "plain vanilla" product designed
131J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement on
the Proposal to Create a Consumer Financial Protection Agency Before the
Committee on Financial Services (July 21, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/09072 lroschstatement.pdf.
13 The CFPA Act requires the new agency to subject its rules and
regulations to a cost-benefit test. Other federal agencies have the same
requirement yet there is little evidence that it is taken seriously. See generally
Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Orderfor Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L.
Rev. 1489 (2002); Moreover, the proponents of the agency tend to see more
costs than benefits associated with consumer borrowing which suggest that the
new agency, if it adopted a similar view, would find that restrictions on
consumer credit availability pass a cost-benefit test.
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by the CFPA are taken into account. Alternatively, the lender
may have to raise fees on both the "plain vanilla" product and its
own product to cover revenue losses associated with the diversion
of customers from its own product to the "plain vanilla" product.
Finally, in any event, the lender would need to factor in the risks
associated with the CFPA's decisions on how to design a plain
vanilla product when making decisions on investment in a new
lending product. To compensate for that added risk, the lender
would have to increase the interest rates and fees for new
products that it introduces.
Overall, the CFPA Act would likely increase the costs of
supplying credit to consumers. The variable cost of lending
would increase as a result of both the paperwork requirements
and the increased litigation exposure that each loan presents.
This would increase interest rates and other fees associated with
extending a loan. In addition, the CFPA Act would increase the
fixed costs of making a particular lending product available to
consumers. New products in particular would face a lengthy and
more involved review process, therefore requiring the
development of disclosures that meet the agency's reasonableness
requirement and could satisfy its unfair, deceptive, and abusive
practices requirements.
Lenders offering new and innovative products could also
face financial exposure from litigation over the provision of such
products. As a result, lenders would have to raise the interest
rates and fees on products to cover these costs or, alternatively,
not make those products available at all.
ii. Impact on the Availability of Consumer Lending Products
We have just seen that the CFPA Act would likely
increase the prices that consumers pay for credit products.
Consumers are actually harmed in two ways. First, higher prices
directly curtail the amount of credit available to consumers;
consumers will become worse off because they no longer get to
enjoy the benefits of that credit. For the credit that consumers
still obtain, they would pay higher prices and have less money to
spend on other things. As we explain in the next section, these
changes in prices and consumption are likely to be very costly.
The second and more serious concern with the CFPA Act
is that it would prevent consumers from obtaining certain credit
products at all. As a result, consumers would lose the entire
benefit they were previously obtaining from those products. In
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extreme cases, consumers may have no other lending product to
turn to and would be liquidity constrained. There are two reasons
to believe that the CFPA Act would completely destroy consumer
access to certain credit products and, in some instances, credit
altogether. The first follows directly from the preceding
discussion: lenders would discontinue the production of lending
products that would no longer be profitable as a result of the
increased costs imposed under the CFPA Act regulatory regime.
Here, we focus on the second reason: the CFPA itself is likely to
directly prevent consumers from obtaining lending products that
they would like to use.
The CFPA would have the authority to ban or restrict
certain lending products.13 3 Of course, the likelihood that the new
agency would ban various consumer lending products that
consumers would use if they were available does not by itself
mean that consumers would be harmed. The well-meaning
scholars who have designed the CFPA Act believe that they have
provided theoretical and empirical evidence which demonstrates
that various lending products, or significant variants of these
products, harm consumers. They believe that many consumers
use these products because they are misinformed and irrational.
This view is misguided for at least two reasons.
First, as we described in Section II, consumers borrow
money for sound and rational reasons. Consumers can improve
their level of well-being by borrowing against future income that
so that their enjoyment of life is not unnecessarily concentrated in
middle age. Consumers also benefit from borrowing for many
other reasons: a temporary short-fall of income, sudden expenses,
entrepreneurial ventures, or a desire to make long-term
investments. In short, the fact that consumer behavior does not
conform to paternalist advocates' subjective valuation of future
time or income does not ipso facto render consumer choices
irrational or welfare-reducing. Indeed, the burden is on those who
would deny consumer's own evaluation of their welfare to prove
that consumers are wrong, and that the CFPA would consistently
make better judgments the gains from which exceed the costs the
CFPA imposes on lenders and borrowers.
Second, consumers are necessarily in a better position than
regulators to decide which products are most beneficial to them
given their particular circumstances. Individuals know their own
preferences, such as their personal tradeoffs between risk and
133CFPA

Act, supra note 1, at §§ 1036(b)(1), 1039.
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certainty, or between consumption and debt. Consumers also
have more knowledge of their own aspirations, needs, future
incomes, and other life plans than regulators could ever have. We
are highly skeptical that regulators could better assess which
lending products should be offered to consumers than those same
lenders who have a direct competitive interest in satisfying
consumers' needs and tastes.
Professors Bar-Gill and Warren argue that regulators
should prevent the sale of harmful consumer lending products in
the same way they prevent the sale of exploding toasters. The
analogy is inapt and, more importantly, does not reflect the type
of consumer lending regulation that these designers of the CFPA
have in mind. Consumers do not want to buy toasters that have a
significant risk of explosion and they can directly benefit from
government regulations that require manufacturers to make
toasters safe. Consumers do want to borrow money even though
there is a risk that they will have trouble paying it back or that
the house they bought might not appreciate as much as they had
hoped. Consumers knowingly choose to take these risks all the
time. The advocates of the CFPA Act are not seeking to prevent
lenders from offering consumers the credit equivalent of an
exploding toaster. Rather, the CFPA Act's advocates believe that
consumers should be restrained from choosing products and
services that significant numbers of consumers have willingly
used safely, to their advantage personally, and to the great benefit
of society as a whole. The CFPA Act's advocates would have
consumers "nudged" into using only those particular products
that the regulators have approved for them. This approach to
regulation would be like having the Consumer Product Safety
Commission prohibit the sale of particular toasters that they
believe consumers do not really need, or requiring toaster
manufacturers to offer consumers a "plain vanilla" toaster in
addition to, and even in preference to, their feature-laden models.
We showed earlier that financial innovation expanded the
supply and accessibility of consumer credit enormously between
the start of the 1980s and the onset of the current financial crisis.
During that period of time, innovations in risk analysis and
securitization, combined with the introduction of many new
credit products, enabled millions of Americans to borrow.
Millions were able to buy homes, which, for the vast majority,
were good investments. Americans were able to borrow against
future income to buy many common consumer durableseverything from automobiles to refrigerators to televisions- that
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households buy especially when they are younger.
The financial innovations helped American consumers
weather some stormy economic times, including the period of
high interest rates and inflation uncertainty in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, the stock market crash of 1987, and the collapse of
the dot.com bubble and the uncertainty following 9/11.
Innovative consumer lending products also helped accommodate
a massive increase in household formation as a result of the baby
boom generation-and their children-entering the workforce.
These financial innovations also relieved the liquidity
constraints that prevented many socially and economically
disadvantaged Americans from gaining access to credit. As a
result, more minorities, single parents, and low-income
households were able to get mortgages, credit cards, and other
lending products that markedly improved their lives.
Furthermore, financial institutions were able to lend money to
more high-risk households because these institutions had tools
that enabled them to better identify and manage the risks; and
because these lenders could diversify their risks through
securitization and other risk management tools.
Based on our analysis of the CFPA Act and how its
proponents envisaged the CFPA Act to regulate consumer
financial products, we believe that the most likely scenario is
that, if enacted, the CFPA Act would reverse the increase in the
availability and democratization of credit that consumers have
benefited from over the last thirty years. The CFPA Act would
result in a credit crunch for many Americans who would either
not have access to credit or have to turn to inferior sources of
credit such as pawn shops and payday lending.
C. The Estimated Effects of the CFPA Act on Economic
Welfare"'
The CFPA Act will impose a significant cost shock to
134 Professor

Adam Levitin argues that these estimates are speculative; see

Adam Levitin, A Critique of Evans and Wright's Study of the Consumer
Financial Protection Agency Act 1 (Georgetown University Law Center,
Public Law Research Paper No. 1492471, Oct. 22, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1492471. We disagree with
his comments as discussed in David S. Evans and Joshua D. Wright, A

Response to Professor Levitin on the Effects of the Consumer Financial
Protection Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit (George Mason Law and
Economics Research Paper No. 09-56, Nov. 3, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1499261.
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lenders. One way to understand the possible impact of the
Treasury's CFPA Act is to examine other shocks to the lending
industry. A major part of our concern with the CFPA Act's
impact on lending costs is that the Act will result in significant
state-by-state variation in regulation, which will undoubtedly
impose increased transaction costs on lenders. One might
immediately intuit that the greater the variation amongst states,
the greater these costs will necessarily be. The 1994 Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) is one such
shock that provides empirical data by which one can assess the
CFPA Act's possible effect. The IBBEA allowed bank and bank
holding companies to expand across state lines; prior to its
passage there had been virtually no interstate branches. The
IBBEA, however, preserved states' rights to impose various costs
on the expansion of out-of-state banks in their states; many states
exercised this right. Thus, the "IBBEA shock" did precisely what
the proposed CFPA Act will do: it ended federal preemption,
causing a proliferation of divergent state laws impacting lending
costs.
Rice and Strahan examine the impact of the IBBEA on
the interest rates paid by small firms.'3 5 By comparing bank
lending in states that imposed restrictions with those that did not,
Rice and Strahan were able to estimate the effect of these stateimposed restrictions on the interest rates paid on bank loans by
small businesses. They found that the interest rates paid by small
businesses were 80 to 100 basis points higher in states with the
most restrictive rules on bank expansion compared with the
states with the least restrictive rules.
We take the conservative 80 basis point regulatory penalty
as a lower bound on the effect the CFPA Act would have on
interest rates. The regulatory restrictions imposed by the states
following.the IBBEA were relatively modest and require little in
the way of judicial interpretation. They included setting a
minimum age of the target institution, restrictions on acquiring
individual branches, imposing a statewide deposit cap, and
preventing, in some cases, setting up a new branch. The scope of
the CFPA Act is enormous in comparison. It would constitute a
highly intrusive federal regulatory agency, require lenders to
comply with differing regulations across 50 states and their
Tara Rice & Philip E. Strahan, Does Credit Competition Affect Small
Firm Finance? (2009), available at http://www2.bc.edu/-strahan/Credit
CompetitionJune2009.pdf.
135
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component municipalities, create a costly product review process,
and expose lenders to litigation under untested laws by federal,
state, and municipal enforcers.
Furthermore, there is also an enormous difference in the
degree of uncertainty that banks would face. The restrictions that
banks faced in some states following the IBBEA were clear and
known with certainty; there was a precise age requirement or
deposit cap imposed by a state. These restrictions did not impose
significant costs on banks deriving from uncertainty with regard
to how the restrictions would be interpreted and change over
time. The CFPA Act, on the other hand, creates considerable
uncertainty because many of the federal and state rules
concerning what lenders can and cannot do are vague and
ambiguous. The application of the "unfair," "deceptive,"
"abusive," and "unreasonableness" standards by the regulators
13 6
and courts will remain highly uncertain for many years.
It is therefore plausible that the CFPA Act would impose a
multiple of the costs on lenders than what the states imposed
through geographic branching restrictions following the passage
of the IBBEA. We report estimates based on the CFPA Act
having the same, twice, and three times the impact on interest
rates as the state-imposed geographic branch restrictions studied
by Rice and Strahan. Those estimates imply that the CFPA Act
would increase interest rates by 80 basis points if the impact of
the CFPA Act's regulations was the same as the geographic
restrictions, 160 basis points if the impact of those regulations
was twice as costly, and 320 basis points if it was three times as
costly. We take 160 basis points as the likely lower bound on the
effect of the CFPA Act on interest rates.
Consumers would not just pay more for credit. In response
to the increased prices, consumers would use less credit, with a
resulting impact on consumer spending. Financial economists
have also used changes in nominal credit card interest rates to
estimate long-run debt elasticity in consumer credit markets of 136 For an illustrative example, state Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs)
modeled on the Federal Trade Commission Act's prohibitions of "unfair" and
"deceptive" business practices have resulted in significant variation in
substantive consumer protection regulation and remedies between states, with
that variation creating significant uncertainty and litigation. See Searle Civil
Justice Institute, State Consumer Protection Acts: An Empirical Investigation
of
Private
Litigation
(November
2009),
available
at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/uploads/CPAProof_113009_fi
nal.pdf.
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1.3.137 That is, a 1 percent (a 100 basis point) increase in the cost
of debt would reduce the amount of long-run debt acquired by
1.3 percent. Combining these estimates, we can generate a rough
prediction of the impact of the CFPA on interest rates and credit
supply assuming that the regulatory costs would generate interest
rate effects that are equal to, twice as bad, and three times as bad
as the state restrictions on interstate banking. An 80 basis point
increase would result in ,a 1.0 percent reduction in amount of
long-term debt, a 160 basis point increase would result 2.1
percent reduction in the amount of long-term debt, and a 320
basis point increase would result in a 4.2 percent reduction in the
amount of long-term debt. These estimates should be interpreted
as lower bounds on consumer responsiveness to changes in
interest rates since they are calculated with data from the 1990s
and, at the current dramatically reduced levels of consumer credit
available after the financial crisis, more consumers are liquidity
constrained and thus more sensitive to interest rate changes. We
take 2.1 percent as the likely lower bound on the reduction in
credit borrowing for these reasons but also because the CFPA Act
may also ban certain lending products that are the only way for
some consumers to borrow.
The reduction in credit availability would be likely to
generate significant losses for consumers. The economic literature
provides some estimates of the effects of regulatory restrictions on
access to credit products likely to fall under the CFPA's scope.
For example, Morse finds that restrictions on financial products
can exacerbate the negative impact of disasters, including 1.2
more foreclosures per 1,000 homes and 2.67 more larcenies per
1,000 homes. 38 This analysis suggests that the harmful
consequences of restrictions on lending products will be felt not
only by consumers facing personal emergencies, but also by
communities that are left less able to rebound quickly from
community shocks. Federal Reserve economists Morgan and
Strain reach similar results, finding that restrictions on consumer
financial products in Georgia and North Carolina resulted in
more bounced checks, more complaints about lenders and debt
17 David Gross & Nicholas Souleles, Consumer Response to Changes in
Credit Supply: Evidence from Credit Card Data (Wharton Business School,
Working Paper, Feb. 4, 2000), available at http://knowledge.wharton.
upenn.edu/papers/1161.pdf. These estimates are based on credit cards and
could be different for other debt products.
38 Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains? (Booth School of
Business, Working Paper, Jan. 2009).
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collectors filed with the Federal Trade Commission, and more
bankruptcies. 39 Similarly, Karlan and Zinman find that access to
consumer financial products can significantly improve household
outcomes ranging from job retention to staving off hunger. 4
The CFPA Act credit squeeze is likely to negatively
impact small businesses and job creation.' Small businesses can
have a difficult time obtaining credit because they present lenders
with significant adverse selection, moral hazard, and asymmetric
information problems - not to mention high failure rates. Indeed,
one estimate suggests that approximately 20% of firms with fewer
than 20 employees did not bother to apply for credit because they
assumed they would be denied.
Small businesses necessarily rely extensively on consumer
financial products. These include home equity loans, personal
loans, auto title loans, and credit cards.4 2 Indeed, almost half of
firms with fewer than 20 employees use a consumer credit card to
help finance their businesses.'43 These small business owners
would encounter the same increase in the cost of credit as regular
consumers and face the same prospect of not being able to get
credit at all. Since small businesses are notoriously fragile these
increases in the cost of credit, or denial of credit, could have far
reaching effects on the viability of small firms.
As a result of its impact on small firms that rely on
consumer credit, the CFPA Act could have serious effects on job
creation. Most net new jobs in the United States are created by
new firms, which by-and-large begin small - often as sole
proprietorships.144
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businesses

account

disproportionate share of new job creation in the United
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States.' 45

' Donald P. Morgan & Michael R. Strain, Payday Holiday: How
Households Fare after Payday Credit Bans 4-5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Working Paper, Feb. 2008). See also, Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer
Credit Access: Household Survey Evidence on Effects Around the Oregon Rate

Cap 2-5 (2009).

14o Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Expanding Credit Access: Using
Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts (Innovations for
Poverty Action, Working Paper, 2008).
141 Durkin, supra note 126, at 1.
142 Charles Ou and Victoria Williams, Lending to Small Businesses by
Financial Institutions in the United States, SMALL BUSINESSES IN Focus:
FINANCE, A COMPENDIUM OF RESEARCH BY THE SMALL BUSINESS

ADMINISTRATION'S OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, at 9 (2009).
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Id.
Net new jobs takes into account the fact that new firms both create jobs

and, when they fail, destroy jobs.
141 John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin & Javier Miranda, Business Formation
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Startup firms with fewer than 20 employees accounted for 86.7%
of net job creation in the United States in 2005.146 As noted above,
about half of these businesses relied on credit cards for financing
and others rely on other forms of consumer financing.
We believe that it is plausible that the CFPA Act could
result in a.significant number of aspiring new small business
owners not being able to obtain the consumer credit necessary to
get their businesses off the ground. An extensive body of
economic literature demonstrates that entrepreneurs are liquidity
constrained and that lack of access to credit deters many from
starting new businesses; the flip side of this finding is that a
contraction in the supply of credit increases the number of
entrepreneurs that are liquidity constrained and thereby reduces
the number of start-ups. 147 Suppose that the increase in credit
prices and reductions in the availability of credit results in only a
5 percent reduction in the number of aspiring entrepreneurs were
not able to start their firms. If we focus just on firms with fewer
than 20 employees, that could lead to the elimination of roughly
4.3 percent (.05 x .867) of net new jobs. We believe that this is a
plausible but hardly precise estimate of the order of magnitude
that the CFPA Act could have on employment.
D. The CFPA Act of 2009 and the Economic Recovery
The timing of the CFPA Act of 2009 could not be worse.
Suppose the Act became law by July 1, 2010. It would take many
months, and perhaps years, before the agency envisioned by the
CFPA Act would begin functioning. The Administration would
have to make a number of appointments, the existing regulatory
agencies would have to transfer staff, and the new agency would
and Dynamics by Business Age: Results from the New Business Dynamics
Statistics, (2008), available at http://econweb.umd.edu/-haltiwan/bds_
paperCAED may2008_may20.pdf.
146 In 2005, net job creation at new firms with less than 20 employees was
2,151,513 while total net job creation across all firms was 2,481,097. See U.S.
Census Bureau, Dynamic Business Statistics, BDS Dataset List, Firm Age By
Firm -Size, available at http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/bdslbdsdatabaselist. Over the period 1987-2005, the net new jobs (taking jobs created
minus jobs lost) by new firms with less than 20 employees exceed overall total
net new jobs because many older and larger firms had net job destruction.
147 See David S. Evans & Boyan Jovanovic, An Estimated Model of
EntrepreneurialChoice under Liquidity Constraints, 97 J. POL. EcON. 808,
808-2 7 (1989).
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have to organize itself and hire additional staff to meet its new
responsibilities. It would then take further time before the new
agency would have the opportunity to interpret its legislative
mandate and adopt rules and regulations. It would also take time
before the courts had reviewed cases to test these interpretations.
The severe limitations on federal preemption would also likely
lead states and municipalities-who would not be required to
wait for the CFPA to get organized and become fully
operational-to adopt new and likely conflicting consumer
lending regulations, creating a stilted, heterogeneous set of legal
regimes at the state level.
For a substantial period of time financial institutions
would face great uncertainty over the likely costs of lending to
consumers for the reasons discussed above; whether their
financial products would be approved by the new agency; the
nature of the plain vanilla products and the effect of these
product on the profitability of lending to consumers; and the
scope of their institutions' litigation exposure. We would expect
financial institutions to address these major new regulatory risks
by reducing their lending to consumers in the face of this
uncertainty. In consequence of these limitations on business
activity, investors would shy away from placing their capital in
firms subject to CFPA Act authority, limiting capital growth if
not actually shrinking it.
That reduction in lending would occur almost
immediately after the passage of the legislation. It would come at
a time when the economy is just beginning a tenuous recovery
from the deepest economic downturn in 75 years. A major
obstacle to the economic recovery is that lack of access to
financing for consumers and businesses. It is well known that
many consumers and businesses in today's economic
environment have great difficulty obtaining mortgages,
educational loans, automobile loans, credit card loans, and other
sources of credit. The Federal Reserve reported consumer credit
dropped by historic rates in the last weeks of the summer 2009. It
decreased from 2.74 trillion in July 2008 to 2.47 trillion in July
2009.148 Small businesses which rely on consumer lending
49
products to finance their operations have been especially hurt.1
Federal Reserve Statistical Release G19, Sept. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/Current/.
141 See, e.g., Joseph A. Mann, Jr., Lack of Credit Hurts Small Businesses,
MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 25, 2009, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/
business/5 min/story/914255 .html.
148
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The CFPA Act would deter financial institutions from expanding
consumer lending needed for the success of these very businesses.
The ramifications of this reduction in consumer lending in
2010 and 2011 that could occur if the Treasury's CFPA Act of
2009 were signed into law are quite serious. Consumer spending
is vital to any economic recovery. Encouraging sustainable
consumer spending requires encouraging policies that induce
consumers to buy homes and consumer durable goods again as
well as to engage in everyday shopping. As is well known,
consumer spending has a multiplier effect, which leads to
dramatic economic expansion and the growth in jobs. With an
unemployment rate of close to 10 percent and weak consumer
spending it would seem particularly counterproductive to have
the government impede credit availability by raising the costs
and risks on consumer lending by financial institutions. It is also
not the time to further restrict lending to small businesses and
dampen the creation of new jobs that are important for pulling
the economy to recovery.
VI. Conclusions
The CFPA Act of 2009 proposed by the U.S. Department
of the Treasury is a misguided attempt to erect a supernanny
agency that would substitute its own choices for how and under
what circumstances consumers should be able to borrow money.
The proponents of the CFPA Act have not provided a basis for
adopting sweeping changes in the regulatory structure of
consumer financial protection regulation. While improving
consumer protection is needed, particularly for the non-bank
institutions that virtually all commentators identify as the source
of most problem mortgages, it is hard to maintain that the
financial crisis would have been avoided by more consumer
protection. i0
Short-term the CFPA Act would jeopardize the current
economic recovery, and recovery from high unemployment,
because the Act would significantly raise the uncertainty over the
costs of lending consumers money. It would take several years for
the new agency to give lending institutions clear guidance and for
110
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CRA AND THE SUBPRIME CRISIS, Nov. 21, 2008, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/20081203analysis.pdf.
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the courts to interpret new legal obligations on lenders,
suppressing lending activity (and investment in lending firms) in
the meanwhile.
Over the longer term, the CFPA Act of 2009 would restrict
the supply of consumer credit, reduce consumer choice over how
consumers can borrow, and increase the cost of consumer credit.
In doing so it would inflict collateral damage on small businesses
that often rely on consumer credit products. A significant part of
these increased costs would come from opening a flood gate of
state regulation and litigation under a new vague legal standard.
The CFPA Act would also turn back the clock on successful
efforts to democratize credit-that is to make credit widely
available so that all segments of American consumers can borrow
to meet their short-term and long-term needs. It would further
make it harder for the new firms that create most jobs to obtain
credit and would thereby lead to a permanent reduction in job
creation.

